

INDIA'S HINDU-MUSLIM QUESTIONS

by

BENI PRASAD

*Professor of Politics
University of Allahabad*


Vol - I

London

GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD

FIRST PUBLISHED IN GREAT BRITAIN
IN 1946

All rights reserved .



*Produced in complete conformity with
the authorised economy standards*

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN
in 10 point Imprint type
BY HUGH PATON AND SONS, LTD.
EDINBURGH

PREFACE

THIS book seeks to offer a diagnosis of the Indian communal problem and to suggest a comprehensive remedy. The opportunity of an English edition has been used to bring the argument up-to-date and to insert some additional matter.

BENI PRASAD.

UNIVERSITY OF ALLAHABAD

CHRISTMAS DAY, 1944

PUBLISHERS' NOTE

The Publishers deeply regret to state that Professor Beni Prasad died at Allahabad on April 8, 1945, a few days after he had written his last letter to England about the publication of this edition of his book.

CONTENTS

PART ONE

Diagnosis

CHAPTER

PAGE

I. HISTORY AND PSYCHOLOGY

9

Social Life and Association. Caste, Caste and Social Cohesion. Classes in Indian Society. The Village Community. The State. Religious Tolerance. Social Practices. Abandonment of Immigrants. The Arrival of Moslems. Hinduism as a Living Stand Face to Face. Reciprocal Influence. A Common Language. Medical Literature. Art. Religious *Rapprochement*. Manners and Customs. Political Relationships. Religion and Politics. The Intellectual Centers. The Modern Age. Transition. The Indian Problem in the World Setting. Modernism and Revivalism. East and West. Indictment of Western Civilization. Ethical Dilemma. Moslems. Tendencies to Acceptance. In Economics. In Social Institutions. In Religion. Reformist-Revivalist Movements. Revivalism Among the Muslims. The Alirudi Movement. Socio-economic Influence in Revivalism. Drawbacks in Revivalism. Separatist Tendencies in Revivalism. Revivalist Interpretation of History. Handicaps of Revivalism. Modernization. Heredity and Environment. Ethnic Composition. The Indian Temperament. Social Psychotherapy.

II. DEMOCRACY AND SEPARATISM

38

The National Movement. Difficulties of Democratic Government. Persistence of Negative Government in India. Economic Conditions. Inadequate Share in Defence. The Paradox of Democracy. The Impracticability of Aristocratic Government. Poverty of Commercial Wealth. The Educated Middle Class. Deficiencies in Indian Education. New Tasks and Handicaps. The Muslim Reaction. The Search for Security. A Greek Illustration. Unity and Diversity. Separate Electorates. Non-co-operation and Khilafat. Political Immaturity. Spiritualism in Politics. Parting of the Ways. The Gulf Widens.

III. POWER AND POLITICS

55

Procrastination. Anomalies and Complexes. Inadequate Sense of Responsibility. Lack of Party Development. Orthodox Parliamentarism. Misapplication of "Economic Determinism". Unity. Pan-Islamism. Difficulties in the Appeal of Pan-Islamism. The Appeal of Pan-Islamism. The Failure of Pan-Islamism in Europe. The Example of the Sudeten Germans. Its Influence on India. Provincial Re-distribution in India. The Dictatorial Temper. Dictatorial Programmes. Modern Propaganda. The Muslim Mass Contact Campaign. Fear of the Future. The Muslim League as "Official" Opposition. The Muslim League on its Mettle. The Situation in 1940. Partition and its Contradictions. Contradictions of Pakistan. Unity of India. The Strategic Position. Nationhood and Statehood. Sources of Resistance to Partition. British Attitude Towards Partition. The Moral of the Idea.

Suggestions

CHAPTER

IV. MARCH FORWARD

Three Categories of Hindu-Muslim Questions. Social Justice. Self-realisation. Universal Education. Improvement in Education. World-orientation. Emphasis on the Social Sciences. Social Reform. Caste and Discommunity. Economic Improvement. Agriculture. Industry. Common Fields of Activity. Clearance of Misunderstandings. A Fresh Stratification and Outlook. Defence. Relief of Educated Unemployment. Modernisation and Secularity. Interconnection of Education, Industry and Defence. The Tempo of Reconstruction. A New Synthesis. Immediate Start.

V. CULTURAL INTEGRATION

Need of Understanding. Common Education. The Question of Language. Hindu and Urdu. Literary Purism. The Inadequacy of 'Live and Let Live.' Recognition of Both the Arabic and Devanagari Scripts. Partial Adoption of the Roman Script. The Coining of Technical Terms. Literary Currents. General Literature. Literary Styles. The Political Aspect of the Language Question. Literary Themes. Humanism.

VI. POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

The Urgency of an Adjustment. War and Reform. The State and Civil Dissensions. Rallying Power of an Equitable Adjustment. Territorial Stability. Declaration of Rights. Distribution of Functions. Exclusive Provincial Jurisdiction. Concurrent Jurisdiction. Defence and Foreign Affairs. Summary. Residuary Powers. Judicial Supremacy. Constitutional Amendment. Science and Government. Limitations of Public Opinion. Public Opinion and Popular Power. The Role of the Legislature. The Executive. De-politicisation of Administration. Composite Ministries. Unsuitability of the Swiss and American Types of Executive. Board of Conciliation. Goodwill Committees. The Communal Award and the Poona Pact. Representation in the Federal Legislature. Safeguarded Joint Electorates. Indirect Election. Functional Representation. Primary Assemblies. Nomination as a Part Substitute for Election. The Services, Boards and Committees. "Scotch Votes." Necessary Conventions. Businesslike Methods.

VII. THE PROSPECT

The Context of the Problem. "Third Party." The Broader Problem. Hindu or Muslim Solidarity. Riots. Futility of *Laissez-faire*. Solution as a Whole. Wider Aspects. Interdependence. Constituent Assembly and its Risks. Arbitration. Standards of Public Life. Favourable Factors. Need of a Moral Effort. The Prospect.

APPENDIX

The Numerical Strength of the Communities.

PART ONE—DIAGNOSIS

CHAPTER I

HISTORY AND PSYCHOLOGY

SOCIAL LIFE AND ASSOCIATIONS

MAN is a social animal in the sense that he can live and fulfil himself only in society. But his natural endowment, apart from the social heritage, is equal to the demands only of a rudimentary organisation. Native impulses suffice only for adjustment to a narrow face-to-face environment. The expansion of community beyond it is a function of thinking, ideas, traditions and loyalties and stops short or proceeds far in accordance with their force and adequacy. So arise groups whose varying degrees of co-operation and conflict, amalgamation and separation, subjection and overlordship constitute the warp and woof of history. Social consciousness varies in depth and intensity in terms of a complex of factors—consanguinity, economic needs, pursuit of security and comfort, expectations of war and peace. It embodies itself in religious and ethical codes, custom and law, social and political organisation, changing with the environment; above all, with the march of the mind. Social life expresses itself through a multiplicity of associations based on kinship and territory, creed and culture, function and citizenship, history and accident. The most important line of division in society so far has been class, a consequence of difference in political status, in wealth, occupation and enlightenment, prestige of birth and style of living.

CASTE

This principle of stratification was fortified and made rigid by that of endogamy—marriage within a circle—in a few ancient

lands; notably in India. 'Apart from normative prescriptions on the four Varnas or castes, the outstanding social fact in India has been a multiplicity of sub-castes, resting primarily on connubium and secondarily on one or more bases like locality, occupation, sect or mere tradition. Social fusion is so natural among neighbouring groups that the ban, once admitted, had to be enforced very rigorously by public opinion and was reinforced by restriction on commensality and by excommunication even for minor lapses. Caste accords with that narrow vision and narrow interest, that small-scale thinking and small-scale organisation which do not strain the mind and are very agreeable to societies in the early stages of development. The system has undergone important vicissitudes; the rules on occupation have been honoured more in the breach than in the observance. Inter-marriage, especially in the form of hypergamy, was permitted for long between various castes and much more frequently between sub-castes. But the endogamous groups have survived, though not without a great deal of absolute and relative change, into the modern age and still number more than two thousand.

CASTE AND SOCIAL COHESION

It is inevitable that an institution like caste should profoundly influence social attitudes. Natural selection as part of biological evolution has implanted in man the altruistic impulse which possesses high survival value and constitutes one of the several bases of the sympathetic emotion. Its extension and development depend on appropriate stimuli from the environment. Colour prejudice is a very formidable inhibition; caste is a greater inhibition than class. It hampers the expansion of social consciousness; it tends, though other factors partly counteract the tendency, to narrow that consciousness of kind in which Professor Giddings finds the root of society. Like sect, it tends to restrict the bounds of effective public opinion. Social endorsement is a universal necessity; it springs from

the innate sociality of man. Every one likes to fall in line with "one's group"; caste and sect restrict and reduce the area of "one's group." Caste has not allowed Hindu society to acquire that degree of homogeneity and centrality of direction which has been attained by modern France, Britain and other European countries.

CLASSES IN INDIAN SOCIETY

After its acceptance as part of the established order, caste was crossed by class which based itself mainly on differences of wealth and enlightenment. Classes which arose within a sub-caste, as the endogamous group is called, allied themselves with corresponding strata in other sub-castes and castes, served to mitigate the narrowness of the latter and allowed a great deal of play to the forces of social cohesion.

THE VILLAGE COMMUNITY

An even greater measure of harmony was achieved through the tendency to self-sufficiency which the difficulties of transport and communication forced on the village until the middle of the nineteenth century. The flow of sympathies and mutual aid natural to a familiar environment combined with the necessity of co-operative defence to raise the village folk above class and caste to a certain extent—to raise them into a community pervaded by a sense of common obligation. The village community attained to a degree of organic wholeness which, in spite of internal imperfections and external handicaps, supported a high standard of ethical culture.

THE STATE

Wider adjustments and loyalties were evoked by the state which organised protection, exacted a price in the form of taxes and furnished a stimulus to higher culture—learning, art and religion—widened the horizon and brought divergent interests to a working equilibrium. The state in ancient India rose from

the level of a police- or law-state to that of a culture state and sometimes took the lead in religious and moral reform. For example, the Mauryan Empire under Asoka in the third century B.C., and the Kushana Empire under Kanishka some time about the commencement of the Christian era were guided by a high sense of mission. They strengthened the hold of Buddhism at home and propagated it beyond in western and eastern Asia respectively. The elaborate organisation of the state was calculated to bring common obligations and aspirations in the foreground of consciousness.

RELIGIOUS TOLERATION

The state in ancient India accepted, with rare exceptions, the diversity of philosophic doctrine, religious belief and worship which a complete freedom of inquiry had brought about.

SOCIAL PRACTICES

Religious toleration has been one of the master characteristics of Indian history. It had its counterpart in social practice, though the latter was influenced inevitably by caste and by reverence for antiquity. There arose numerous systems of theology associated with the cults of Shiva, Vishnu and other gods or rather aspects of the god-head, and with protestant creeds like Buddhism and Jainism. The same intellectual and moral conditions were responsible for the development of various systems of philosophy ranging from atheism to pantheism and pointing to diverse paths such as knowledge, faith, devotion or activism. Every one of them found adherents or exercised influence throughout the country and among all groups. Every caste, sub-caste, group or locality followed its code of custom, which was usually invested by law-givers like Manu and by governments with the force of law. Every community was free to live its own life; no general conformity was desired, much less insisted upon. Every single group, however, wanted

its members to stick to its own norms and its own practices. It was inevitable that these should alter in the course of ages through religious reformation, the progress or retardation of enlightenment, economic change, political revolution, state legislation, group resolution or the silent operation of opinion. Civilisation is essentially dynamic and negates complete stagnation. But change was slow and conservatism was the rule.

ABSORPTION OF IMMIGRANTS

Such was the subjective environment—caste exclusiveness, class inclusiveness, village harmony, moderate sense of political obligation, religious tolerance, social diversity joined to traditionalism—which from the commencement of the Christian era onwards received and absorbed a succession of immigrants like the Scythians, the Sakās and the Huns. There was not much social fusion at the start; the new-comers, already stratified into classes or even something like castes, became new sub-castes in the fourfold scriptural scheme. They adopted the Indian languages and the general framework of manners and practices. They absorbed the culture or part of the culture enshrined in the Sanskrit, Pali and Prakrit literatures. Above all, they imbibed the Hindu view of spirit and matter, of sin and merit, of after-life and salvation and were led by chance or choice to embrace any of the numerous cults. As a rule, no one cared to keep any historical records in ancient India; the struggles, the defeats and the victories which might have accompanied the march of the immigrants sank into oblivion within a few generations; the very fact of their foreign origin was clean forgotten; they were as good Hindus as any others. Unavoidably, there occurred a great deal of intermixture. Those who changed their habitat sometimes found their way into the sub-castes of their new environment. Epigraphy bears witness to occasional adoption into new castes under royal auspices. Warriors and chieftains never lacked obliging priests to raise them to high Kshatriya rank.

THE ARRIVAL OF MUSALMANS

The Hindu capacity for assimilation was, however, put to a severe strain with the arrival of Musalmans first in Sind in the eighth century and then in the north-west from the eleventh to the eighteenth centuries in a succession of raids, invasions and group or individual migrations. They came as conquerors, traders or quiet settlers; they were ruling the north by the beginning of the thirteenth and the Deccan by the fourteenth centuries. Islam came to India with a highly developed philosophy and theology; its strict monotheism presented a contrast to the Hindu pantheon; it was a proselytising religion, so that many an armed attack was represented by its authors as a *jihad* or holy war. The Musalmans had developed great literatures in Arabic and Persian; *inter alia*, they had developed the art of historiography and composed long accounts of wars, plunders, massacres and conquests on all sides. Contacts were maintained with Islamic states, centres of religion and seats of culture in the Middle East through migration, travel, pilgrimage, trade and adventure. Ideas and movements continued to flow from Arabia, Iraq and Iran. All this rendered it difficult for the Hindu system to assimilate the new-comers. General social fusion was impossible; apart from caste, it was banned by the religious fervour which kept the Musalmans a distinct community also in Spain and the Balkans which they ruled for several centuries.

HINDUISM AND ISLAM STAND FACE TO FACE

It was soon clear that Hindu culture could not swamp the Musalmans as it had swamped the earlier settlers. It was equally clear that Muslim culture could not swamp the Hindus as it had swamped Egypt, Anatolia and Iran. Hindu theology and metaphysics were grounded in three thousand years of thinking and meditation. Hindu manners and customs, fasts

and festivals, were thoroughly adjusted to the climate and the environment. After the Muslim conquest the Hindu social system put itself on the defensive and tightened itself more than ever before. Priestcraft appropriated the authority which the state had so far exercised in a more flexible manner in social affairs. The machinery of social readjustment fell out of gear; the tendency to inflexibility really reflected a maladjustment, but it steadied the system for the time being. So, the two religions and the corresponding cultures stood facing each other in the thirteenth century in the north and in the fourteenth century in the Deccan.

RECIPROCAL INFLUENCES

But as soon as the first waves of conquest, plunder and desecration had spent themselves, there began the operation of the forces, inherent in human nature, which interknit contacts into co-national wholes and transform plurality into community. Hindu chieftains and soldiers were soon fighting under Muslim rulers against Hindus and Musalmans alike. Some time later Muslim captains and soldiers were to be found with Hindu rajahs. Trade and industry wove new relationships. Preaching and political influence brought millions of Hindus into the Islamic fold, inevitably with their own habits of thought, languages and manners. Some of them intermarried with the Muslim immigrants who in their turn had already begun to feel the grip of the land of their adoption—its climate, its intellectual atmosphere and its economic framework.

A COMMON LANGUAGE

The Indian Musalmans adopted or stuck to the Indian languages, though they often employed Persian and Arabic for higher education and the former also for administration. They naturally affected the dialect spoken near the capital city of Delhi. Philological research has not yet succeeded in tracing

its growth in detail but it was probably the Musalmans and the Hindus associated with them that refined and standardised its conjugations and syntax, enriched its vocabulary and from the fourteenth century onwards raised it to a primacy which it has retained down to the present day among the northern dialects and languages. With a large admixture of Arabic and Persian words, it appeared as Urdu. Long afterwards, with a large admixture of Sanskrit words, it appeared as the leading Hindu dialect—*Khariboli*. Both Urdu and Hindi have a common ground-work, a common grammar and a very large number of common words of Sanskrit and Prakrit, and some of Arabic and Persian, origin. In ordinary parlance, they are scarcely distinguishable. Urdu developed, from the seventeenth century onwards, a great literature counting both Hindu and Muslim names on its roll. The various Hindi dialects, specially the Braja Bhasha and the Avadhi, and the other Indian languages like Bengali in the east and Gujarati in the west were similarly used by Muslims as vehicles of poetic expression, devotional fervour, ethical teaching and intellectual gymnastics.

MEDIEVAL LITERARY ACTIVITY

No divergence could obscure the fact that a common language had grown up to mediate the intercommunication of the Hindus and Muslims throughout the greater part of the country. In addition to it there were the other great languages and literatures, Bengali, Marathi, Gujarati and Sindi, which were developed jointly by Hindus and Musalmans from the fourteenth to the eighteenth or nineteenth century. All Indian literature, whether composed by Hindus or Muslims, displayed features, reflective of environment, which distinguished it sharply from all foreign literature whether Muslim or non-Muslim. A distinctively Indianist literature constitutes one of the most significant developments in medieval India. Besides, many Hindus learnt Persian and some of their Persian compositions had merit

enough to endure to the present day. On the other side, a great Muslim scholar Alberuni mastered Sanskrit as early as the eleventh century, and his account and appreciation of Hindu achievements in science and philosophy have acquired permanent value. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Muslim scholars translated into Persian Sanskrit works like the Atharva Veda, the Upanishadas, the Ramayana, the Mahabharata, the Yogavashishtha, the Bhagavata, the Harivansha and the other Puranas. In fact, the greater part of the literary activity in India between the fourteenth and nineteenth centuries represents either Hindu-Muslim collaboration or the interaction of reciprocal influences.

ART

This fundamental collaboration is even more pronounced in the domain of art. Medieval Indian architecture represents an organic fusion of indigenous and Saracenic motives and styles and derives from it qualities of strength and grace. Painting, another of the great modes of the expression of a people's soul, develops from the sixteenth century onwards in common schools at the hands of Hindu and Muslim masters and becomes truly Indian. Styles of music and dance became and have remained absolutely common. In all these spheres there emerged by the eighteenth century a solid and permanent achievement, basically Indian, strictly speaking, neither Hindu nor Muslim in technique.

RELIGIOUS "RAPPROCHEMENT"

There was also a marked *rapprochement* in religious matters from three sides. In the first place, Hindu converts retained some of their ancient practices; many were only half-converts. Musalmans, as a whole, could not escape the influence of Hindu metaphysics and religious practices. Secondly, Islamic monotheism brought into conspicuous relief the monotheism or the henotheism of the Hindu system of theology and partly inspired

the Bhakti movements. The spiritual fervour found expression in the cult of faith in God, a mystical identification with His omnipresence, surrender to His will and self-forgetfulness in love and devotion to Him. Thirdly, there arose whole sects like those of Kabir (1440-1518), presumably a Musalman, and Nanak (1469-1538) which combined elements both of Hinduism and Islam. The same breadth of vision marked the hymns and teachings of Dadu, Chaitanya, Tukarama and many others. A common point of view is clearly in evidence in a great deal, though not in all, of the neo-spiritualistic literature of medieval India, both Hindu and Muslim. Hindu and Muslim saints have drawn and still draw disciples from both communities; the latter worship at common shrines, sing the same songs and observe the same discipline.

MAÑNERS AND CUSTOMS

Caste and creed forbade inter-marriage, but there were classes to which Hindus and Musalmans alike belonged—classes of peasants, landlords, traders, artisans and labourers, soldiers, government servants, etc. There was a broad identity of economic interests which held a class together and cut across the religious cleavage. Behind it all was the similarity in the standards set up by Hindu and Muslim ethical codes. Within a class, Hindus and Musalmans were often indistinguishable from each other in dress, housing, etiquette and manners, whether in villages or in towns. The position of woman, the age of marriage and some wedding ritual were uniform within a class and common to its Hindu and its Muslim members. It was only natural that Hindus and Muslims should join one another's festivals.

POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS

In the domain of politics, the Hindu chiefs and princes retained autonomy in Rajputana, Bundelkhand, many of the

hilly regions and in the Konkan and preserved their independence south of the Krishna until the sixteenth century. But the Muslim impact immensely strengthened the centripetal forces and drew the whole country steadily into a single political system on the basis of annexation and suzerainty. Everywhere the old Hindu framework of administration was accepted ; it formed the basis of the reforms carried out chiefly by Sher Shah and the Mughal Emperors in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The village was left much to itself so long as the requisite revenue was forthcoming. A few Hindu sub-castes whose main occupation was government service formed the political link between the Muslims and the Hindus. The Musalmans usually occupied a privileged position in the state and filled most of the chief offices, but the disparity lessened during the reigns of Akbar (1556-1605) and Jahangir (1605-27). The royal family married into Rajput houses ; religious toleration was proclaimed as the policy of the state ; indeed, a new spiritual and cultural synthesis was attempted by the Emperor Akbar in the form of the Din-i-ilahi as a counterpart of the new political order. The Emperor Jahangir recorded in his diary almost casually that his court celebrated the Hindu festivals Raksha-Bandhan, Dasehara, Divali, as well as the Muslim Id and Shaberat.

RELIGION AND POLITICS

The Mughal adjustment contained the nucleus of nationalism, but it was subject to dangers from within and from without. The religious distinction was there and might become significant again in politics and in social relationships. Religion represents an adaptation, at once extensive and intensive, to the Universe as a whole and to the spiritual principle underlying it. It universalises group values and standards, invests them with a supernatural sanction, seeks to stamp them on the individual and to confirm the faith in a certain system of things and ways of action. It stirs the soul to its depths ; it offers consolation in

suffering and an escape from gnawing reminiscence. It pertains to the spiritual interests and may be led by the organic wholeness of life to claim control over all the interests. Totalitarianism is a possibility latent in every set of religious dogmas. The actual extent of theocratic realisation depends on the balance between religiosity and secularity, the achievements in positive knowledge and exigencies of social adjustment. Besides, every religion has its sheet anchor in certain scriptures and may, under appropriate circumstances, insist on conformity of all institutions and ways of life to them. Plurality of religions contains the possibility of groups returning to different sources of inspiration and, therefore, drifting apart.

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

On the political side the Mughal adjustment was also liable to disturbance from the will of the monarch, that is, from the narrow basis of despotic government. A slight departure from the policy of toleration during the reign of Shah Jahan (1627-58) was accentuated by the puritanic and orthodox Aurangzeb (1658-1707) into an attempt at a theocracy. At the same time the southern expansion of the Mughal Empire encroached on the autonomy hitherto enjoyed by the Marathas under the weaker Sultanates of the Deccan. The revolts that ensued in Rajputana, the Deccan and the Punjab broke up the Mughal Empire in all but name and a new adjustment was wrought during the hundred years of disintegration that followed. The lessons of the immediate past were not forgotten. The fabric of Hindu-Muslim culture built up by five centuries of conscious and unconscious co-operation was maintained and strengthened; it has stood the severest of tests and was accepted as part of the working capital of the land. In the new states that supplanted the Mughal Empire a privileged position was occupied, in respect of political direction and offices, by those who shared caste or creed with the princes—Rajputs, Marathas, Sikhs, Jats or

Musalmans. But religious persecution was not resumed anywhere. There were unifying forces to which the Mughal Empire (1526-1707) had imparted great momentum—the forces of commerce and industry, improved transport and communication by land, river and sea, cultural *rapprochement* and common ideologies, common administrative practices and the tradition, now firmly established, of an all-India political supremacy. On the crest of these centripetal waves arose a far-flung Maratha Empire in the eighteenth century.

THE MODERN AGE

But the country had already been drawn into far wider orbits of trade, diplomacy and colonial rivalries, and a hundred years (1757-1856) sufficed for the British nation-state, acting through the East India Company, to annex the greater part of the country and reduce the remaining principalities to vassalage. A decisively new era opened in the history of India; political unification was carried to completion with the aid of science. Three revolutions—the religious, the economic and the political—which took more than three centuries to work themselves out in Europe, burst together on India and, what was equally momentous, in the wake of political subjection. The old social order was shaken to its foundations and, with it, the common culture reared under its auspices. The old adjustments of the priestly, aristocratic, agricultural, trading and industrial classes converging to certain common centres of control, were suddenly and violently loosened. The impact of the Industrial Revolution began to break up the old village economy and cottage industry; the contact with European science, literature and philosophy meant a cross-fertilisation of culture; new currents of thought and reorganisation came from Europe or arose from within, especially after the state patronage of English education adopted as a policy during the Governor-Generalship of Lord William Bentinck (1827-35); the British genius for administration

remodelled the old institutions. After the Mutiny of 1857 and its suppression had swept off the old dynastic centres of loyalty, the field was clear for political movements and organisations of a different order. The logic of history summoned the country to make up for the long isolation from world affairs and for the consequent ignorance of world events. The hundred years that followed may be described as a period of transition in every walk of life, readjustment on new lines and attempts to recover political autonomy.

TRANSITION

It takes time to rebuild new habits in individual life and for new traditions in social life to replace those which are breaking down. The process calls for a vast effort of reorientation and is primarily the province of reason. The psychological difficulty consists in obtaining a corresponding change in those feelings which represent subjective valuations of activities and in which, therefore, customs and institutions are embedded. Feeling is not an adequate guide in complex situations; yet its sanction is vital to those higher adjustments which constitute progress. From this discrepancy between reason and feeling arise the delays and confusions which are writ large over many tracts of behaviour in the modern age. When new bearings have to be found, it becomes difficult to see life steadily and as a whole. Many aspects of the old adjustment rise up as problems; the dying embers revive; new antagonisms flare up.

THE INDIAN PROBLEM IN THE WORLD SETTING

It was a three-fold task that the logic of transition set to India, specially in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Firstly, during the latter half of the nineteenth century, the world was fast becoming a single economic whole. India had somehow to line up with the big industry and claim her share of the growing wealth. Secondly, science was annihilating distance,

throwing together peoples hitherto far apart and, therefore, different from one another, and thus raising problems of race, colour, subjection, imperialism and exploitation. India had to comprehend the panorama of world affairs and win a place in keeping her dignity and self-respect. Thirdly, contact cross-fertilises cultures ; the impact of the west set in motion new currents in the domains of religion, philosophy, literature, institutions and economics. India had to integrate the new elements into a consistent whole.

MODERNISM AND REVIVALISM

The intellectual and moral effect evoked by these fundamental tasks has necessarily been very complicated, but it is possible to distinguish two tendencies, sometimes running parallel to each other, sometimes reinforcing and sometimes conflicting with each other. From their interaction and from the accompanying political reaction, arose the Hindu-Muslim problem in its present phase. The two tendencies may be designated, for the sake of convenience, modernism and revivalism.

EAST AND WEST

Indian culture was extraordinarily rich in religious lore, metaphysical speculation, imaginative poetry, artistic tradition and æsthetic workmanship. Indian philosophy, whether cultivated in Hindu or in Muslim schools, found the ultimate source of knowledge in intuition as distinct from sensuous experience. Its focus was set by the inner spirit rather than by the environment. Western contact promised to supply just what it lacked—a scientific outlook, a positive tone and a secular ethics. From the interplay of the inwardness of the eastern civilisation and the extra version of the western, there might possibly have arisen a new synthesis, a decisive contribution to world progress.

INDICTMENT OF WESTERN CIVILISATION

As a matter of fact, this consummation has been hindered by a variety of causes. Western nations have been dominated by ideals of economic aggrandisement and political ascendancy and have shown little appreciation of the spiritual inwardness of Indian culture. In India, apart from the inertia and conservatism of every traditional culture, the resistance to western thought has been reinforced by its association with foreign domination. The latter hurt the pride and put up the back against all the influences that radiated from Europe or America mainly through the English language and literature. Nor was it easy to repress genuine and serious misgivings about the intrinsic worth and morality of western civilisation. It suffers from an ethical dualism sanctioning one set of ideals over the internal life of a state, a race or region, and then altogether a different set of ideals for relations with those beyond. Not to speak of the governments, the churches of the west, especially those of the Teutonic peoples, fail before the colour bar. Conversion to Christianity in Africa, India or Polynesia has never carried a status of equality, social or political, with the whites. Western peoples have waged wars of ever-increasing extent and ferocity amongst themselves, either because of outworn and irrational system of racial and national hatred or because of rivalry for the possession of backward territories, rich in raw materials and mineral resources, or offering markets and fields of investment. The exploitation of the coloured races in Asia and Africa often implied a more or less complete indifference towards the welfare of hundreds of millions of human beings. The 'frightfulness' often employed by white rulers to quell 'native' revolts and disturbances, seems to suggest that their civilisation has nailed its flag to racial ascendancy, nationalism exaggerated to the point of imperialism and economic exploitation to the exclusion of general welfare. The ruling classes in the western states dwelt often with great eloquence and, some-

times, with ill-concealed delight on the poverty, illiteracy and the internal dissensions which seemed to disqualify the backward peoples for self-government. But it rarely occurred to them to inquire if they themselves possessed the qualities necessary for governing others—intellectual apprehension, broad vision, imaginative sympathy, moral idealism, consistent disinterestedness and habitual self-abnegation. There was scarcely a statesman or a publicist in Europe who cared to reflect if the western civilisation at its present stage was even capable of fitting its votaries for exercise of power and of raising them above the temptations inherent in irresponsible sway.

ETHICAL DUALISM

All this stands in sharp contrast to the ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity, popular government or socialism, which have been preached for a century and a half and partially applied to internal affairs. As Rudyard Kipling put it, "there ain't no ten commandments east of Suez." The attempts made by many writers or statesmen to cover up the chasm, that is, to resolve the dualism, by pleas of biological inferiority or innate incapacity on one side, trusteeship and protection of minorities on the other and gradualness of progress on all hands, howsoever soothing to the western conscience, leave the Oriental gaping in wonder and amazement at their capacity for self-complacency and self-deception.

MISGIVINGS

Inevitably there arises the question: Isn't there something radically wrong with a civilisation whose exponents and leaders should practise or acquiesce in sordid and inhuman materialism? Is it worthy of imitation or assimilation? Or, will its touch pollute the current of Indian life? True, science has mastered nature, but man in the west has neglected the more difficult enterprise of mastering human nature. He has forgotten that

the essence of civilisation is not *mere control* of environment but *control through the social and humanitarian spirit*; Outward changes are important, but they remain amoral, unless backed by an improvement in the inner nature, an expansion and deepening of sympathies, growth in disinterestedness, regard for others, and capacity of sacrifice for the social whole. To this ethical consciousness in terms of humanity, no approximation has yet been made by western civilisation. It has, accordingly, provoked grave questionings and antagonisms.

TENDENCIES TO ACCEPTANCE

It is clear that western thought and practice, far from commanding ready or universal allegiance, provoked much criticism of a fundamental character. On the other hand, its ideals for internal consumption, apart from foreign relations, were full of suggestions and inspiration for the transformation which the dawn of a new era had rendered necessary in India and elsewhere. If they were capable of rendering the western peoples richer, happier and more powerful, they might, *mutatis mutandis*, serve to indicate the direction and methods of institutional reorganisation in the east.

IN ECONOMICS

It was inevitable that the structure of Indian industry, trade and finance should gradually approximate to western lines. British economic interests certainly introduced a grave complication, but the Industrial Revolution soon gripped India. The mass production of factories has been accepted by many as unavoidable; it has been welcomed by some as a promise of plenty; it has been resisted by others not only because of the horrors which set moralists like Ruskin and Tolstoy against it but also because of its divergence from the system known to the genius and economy of Indian civilisation. Surrender to it has appeared like surrender to something alien; instead, a

plea for the revival of the spinning-wheel, the cottage industry or the self-sufficing village has touched a patriotic chord ; it seems to harmonise with national self-respect ; it can be represented as a defence not only against western materialism but also against western domination. Mechanical industrialisation, accordingly, has been accompanied by a movement for resuscitation of handicrafts.

IN SOCIAL INSTITUTION

A closer interplay of revivalism and modernism occurred in another important department of national life. Reforms in social organisation suggested themselves soon after the western impact. The abolition or relaxation of caste, the elevation and education of womanhood and the depressed classes, the raising of the age of marriage, altogether a keener sense of social justice were vital to national progress. But while a few championed these causes on purely rational grounds and western example, others found a more satisfactory and more effective plea in the ancient scriptures. To represent reform as a return to the freer and simpler life of the Vedic age was to defeat conservatism on its own ground and at the same time to gratify the sense of national pride and self-respect.

IN RELIGION

What was true of social reform in this respect was true with far greater force of religion. Here the very idea of borrowing from the west seemed unthinkable ; it would be tantamount to sacrilege. Did not India possess the richest store of divine wisdom and the profoundest systems of philosophy that had ever dawned on the human mind ? They certainly sufficed to furnish all the concepts and all the modes of worship, meditation and social service which reformers required to purify and ennoble the current religious life.

REFORMIST-REVIVALIST MOVEMENTS

Hence, revivalism was one of the keynotes of the Brahma Samaja founded by Raja Ram Mohan Roy in Bengal in 1828, and yet more emphatically of the Arya Samaja established by Swami Dayanand Saraswati in the north in 1875. The Arya Samaja took its stand exclusively on the Vedas and rejected the Smritis, the Puranas and later writings and practices so far as they did not conform to the Vedas. The Prarthana Samaja in the Bombay Presidency drew its inspiration mainly from the Brahma Samaja. The year 1875 also witnessed the inauguration of the Theosophical Society by the American Colonel Olcott, who sought, *inter alia*, to confirm Hindus in their ancient spirituality and outlook. The movement was led with great energy and fervour by Mrs Annie Besant after her arrival in India in 1892. The revivalist note is perceptible in the writings and speeches of most other reformers, social and religious, in every part of the country. They sought to wean the Hindus from the superstitions which seemed to degrade them and to warp their whole thinking and which were out of accord with the true religion. "Back to the Vedas" or "Back to the Shastras" was the ceaseless cry.

REVIVALISM AMONG THE MUSLIMS

"Back to the example of the Prophet," "Back to the early Khilafat" was the call of the revivalism which occurred among the Muslims. Here the movement was complicated by Middle East contacts and was coloured to a greater degree by recollections of the lost dominion. There is in pan-Islamism itself an element of revivalism—a passion to shake off western domination and return to the glorious epoch of righteous and widespread Muslim sway. Early in the nineteenth century Haji Shariat Allah, inspired by the Wahabi movement of Arabia, preached a return to the pristine purity of Islam and discouraged contrary etiquette

and customs. He felt that India, on passing under British rule, had ceased to be Dar-ul-Islam—the land of Islam or peace—and had become Dar-ul-Harb—the land of war. His son Dudhu Miyan, proclaimed the equality of man, energetically espoused the cause of the poor and the distressed, upheld puritanism and forbade un-Islamic practices. Saiyad Ahmad of Rai Bareilli in the United Provinces founded the Tariqah-i-Mohammadiyah or the return to the ways of the Prophet and envisaged a holy war. He sought to wean the Musalmans from many wedding and other ceremonies, processions, waste of money over graves and death anniversaries, etc., on the ground of non-conformity with the teachings of the Prophet. The Ahl-i-Hadis, founded about the same time, proclaimed afresh the unity of God, the exclusive supremacy of the Holy Quran and Hadis (or Traditions), denounced polytheism, the worship of saints and all those customs which prevailed among the Muslims in contradiction to the true faith. A very strong note of revivalism is also struck by Mirza Ghulam Admad Qadiani (1839-1908).

THE ALIGARH MOVEMENT

The Muslim revivalists denounced English education as heretic, but a new line was taken by Sir Saiyad Ahmad Khan (1817-1898), who held that the religious toleration adopted as a policy by the British Government justified India being regarded as Dar-ul-Islam. He took his stand firmly on the Quran, but appealed for its rational understanding and held that there was a considerable conformity to it on the part of Christian teaching. He urged that there was nothing inconsistent with the Quran in social reform and in education and emancipation of woman. Above all, he sought to reconcile the new with the old education and learning through the establishment of the Mohammadan Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh in 1875.

STEADYING INFLUENCES IN REVIVALISM

Révilalismi is a frequent occurrence in the history of every religion, but it acquired unusual significance in the Indian crisis of transition. Like every great movement, it had its advantages and disadvantages ; it solved some difficulties and raised others. Psychologically, it was a partial restoration of the self-respect which had been deeply injured by political subjection. It represented at once resistance to western encroachments, a recompense for the present degradation, a hope for the reign of righteousness in future. It steadied the gaze against the superficial glammers of the west ; it strengthened the moral fibre against the seduction of western fashion ; it checked the mere imitation, as distinct from the selective assimilation, of European ways ; it facilitated social reform and assisted the reconciliation of some modern conceptions with the time-honoured scheme of thought. It is a source of inspiration, a quickening of energies calculated to foster a movement for freedom and self-government.

DRAWBACKS IN REVIVALISM

But it is also tempted to decry and check modernisation in many respects and to hinder the country from coming fully into line with the modern currents in science, philosophy and economics. Nor can revivalism be confined to an appeal to the primary sources of religious ideas. It cannot remain a precise and logical throw-back ; it becomes a torrential movement, sweeping the past into the present, selecting ideals from any stage, real or imaginary, of the past. It draws upon the later theological and ethical traditions, historical examples and patterns of organisation. What is equally momentous, it is not always the true original but a present-day conception or interpretation of it that comes to guide thought and action.

SEPARATIST TENDENCIES IN REVIVALISM

The most serious aspect of revivalism in India in the nineteenth century was its bifurcation. The intellectual and emotional reaction of India to a very acute and unprecedented crisis of transition was taking a complicated form ; one of its aspects was a return to different sources of inspiration. There was a real difference between the India of the Vedic age and the Arabia of the early Khilafat. Hindus and Musalmans were going beyond the last thousand years of *rapprochement* back to distant and divergent traditions and heroes and, therefore, further away from one another in some important spheres of life. In fact, the two revivalisms stimulated each other, competed with each other and became more and more different in outlook. Religious neutrality and expediency alike forbade the British Government to guide or harmonise them. This was one of the serious disadvantages attendant on the existence of a government which was not organic with the life of the people and felt no urge to integrate its policy with their enduring interests. It was not equal to the task of moral leadership in the face of divergent revivalisms. It accepted them both and adjusted itself to them both, after a preliminary effort to suppress the extreme manifestations of the Islamic revival. Leadership rested in the hands of fervid puritans who were content with nothing less than the pure word of the gospel as they interpreted it. Revivalism weaned away the half-converts from the lingering Hindu beliefs and practices. On the other hand, the Hindu sub-castes which had adopted Muslim ways of living gravitated towards Hindu revivalism or modernism. Hindus and Musalmans alike began to give up many practices which they had imbibed from one another and which had served to bridge the chasm between the two communities. Many areas of common life and thought have thus been restricted and many meeting-places obliterated. Revivalism leads to the withdrawal of one community from the other's festivals which the natural forces

of sympathy and imitation tend to make common to both. It fosters a conscious retention and accentuation of existing divergences and the invention of new ones in regard to diet and dress, manners and etiquette and magnifies them all into profound 'cultural' diversities. It tends to diminish the common elements in the literary productions of the Hindus and the Musalmans and propagates itself by claiming control over the education of the young and by founding separate schools, academies, colleges and universities. It imparts its own tone to literature, favouring the elimination of Sanskrit terms from Urdu and that of Arabic terms from Hindi, Bengali and other languages. Revivalism prompts organisation on communal lines and often assumes an aggressive tone which brings the different communities into acrimonious debate over theological and other matters.

REVIVALIST INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY

Revivalism, like every considerable movement, has tinged the interpretation of history. It has, for instance, served to cast a halo round ancient India and medieval Arabia which almost defies criticism. The Hindu revivalist lingers over the long period of Hindu independence and invests with the glory of paradise the ancient self-sufficing village, the spinning wheel, the simple life, the placid contentment and the spiritual devotion. The Muslim revivalist delights in dwelling over the five centuries of Muslim rule in India. The Maratha revivalist feels that his ancestors would have quickly recovered from the defeat at Panipat in 1761 and, but for British intervention, established their dominion over the whole country. The Sikh revivalist cannot forget that his forefathers were the last independent rulers of the Punjab and that it was from them that the British took over in 1848. Historical events which would ordinarily call forth only calm and dispassionate explanation serve under revivalist influence to reinforce separatist ambitions in politics.

It is not mere accident that the Hindu Sabha has found some of its leaders in Maharashtra where the Hindu predominance in population would not lead one to expect a Hindu-Muslim problem at all. Historical reminiscences centring round Lucknow, Jaunpur, and, above all, Agra and Delhi, the great capitals of the Mughal empire, partly explain the influence which the small Muslim population of the United Provinces—14 per cent. in the province—exercises over the policy of the Muslim League. Nor is it difficult with the revivalist background to understand that some concatenation of circumstances should lead the Musalman to dream of re-establishing Muslim rule over certain provinces and that the Sikh should threaten grim resistance.

HANDICAPS OF REVIVALISM

• At the same time revivalism suffers from two severe handicaps. In the first place, it stimulates the foundation of new sects and sub-sects, incorporating subordinate revivalisms, partly cancelling one another and weakening the force of the whole movement. In the second place, revivalism exhausts its force as soon as the necessary adjustments have been made and the ground prepared for nationalist and modernist developments. It fluctuates in its course from age to age and from region to region.

MODERNISATION

Revivalism has been one of the leading factors in modern Indian life, but it has ~~not~~ been, it could not be, the sole factor. Nothing can withstand the onset of modern science and its application to transport and communication. Industry has been mechanised, though rather slowly on account of political complications. Science, pure and applied, makes for modernisation as distinct from revivalism. Even in the nineteenth century, western social philosophy evoked warm admiration amongst an increasing number of educated men and prompted a great

is a perennial source of 'misunderstanding between 'England and India and has been partly responsible for the breakdown of some negotiations for compromise, for instance, in 1921, 1931, 1939 and 1942. The temperamental difference partly accounts for the demand for declarations on one side and the refusal or evasion on the other. From the standpoint of Hindu-Muslim relations, the psychological traits have been making for adjustment in some respects and maladjustment in a few particulars. They are responsible for a common scale of values, a deep sense of spirituality, a capacity to rise above the earthy and the passing exigency, and a common respect for learning, character, heroism and sacrifice. The hold of principles serves to counteract many fissiparous tendencies and to secure approximation between lines of cultural development. On the other hand, the turn for abstractions has sometimes rendered compromise difficult; for example, negotiations between the National Congress and the Muslim League broke down or simply did not commence in 1938 and 1939 because of the insistence on one side and sturdy refusal on the other, of the prior recognition of the Muslim League as the sole representative of Muslim opinion and of the Congress as a Hindu organisation. It is not the merits of the demand or the refusal that call for attention here; it is the tendency to stand on abstract claims that is noteworthy. Abstractions, torn from their ethical moorings and sociological context, degenerate into catch-words and diffuse an emotional penumbra which threatens to obscure the rock-bottom facts and fundamental requisites of political life. The same mentality is responsible for the presentation of political or communal claims in all their logical completeness. Every people is devoted to its own emblems. The emotionalism of the Indian temperament manifests itself in love for flags, slogans and songs. That these characteristics are shared in equal degree by all is also proved by the readiness with which the varieties of symbolism invented by one party find their counterpart in the other party. The attachment to rival symbolisms, springing

from the same psychological make-up, has been responsible for many misunderstandings during the last decade.

SOCIAL PSYCHOTHERAPY

It is not easy to alter temperamental traits, but psycho-analysis points out that the first step in overcoming their disadvantages is to be conscious of their existence. It is necessary to realise that logic, principle, declaration and definition, though they possess great value, must be adjusted to the necessities of compromise and working settlement. Especially, the transition from negative to positive government, that is, from a stagnant police-state to a dynamic welfare-state, with its numerous enterprises, educational and economic, on the basis of large-scale co-operation, calls for a practical turn of mind, a habit of give and take, of willingness to sink non-essentials, a refusal to erect trifles into principles. - There is nothing in all this that really runs counter to the Indian scale of values. It is, however, a set of qualities to be brought consciously into play against the older manifestations which were suited to an environment of a negative and absolutist government.

CHAPTER II

DEMOCRACY AND SÉPARATISM

THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT

IN this background of psychology and history, it is desirable to unravel the tangled skein of Hindu-Muslim relationships in the domain of politics since the middle of the 19th century.

The suppression of the Mutiny of 1857 combined with the impact of western liberalism to give a new direction to Indian politics. The aspiration for independence, natural to every people, began to crystallise in the form of a movement for closer association with the government in the sixties of the 19th century and gradually crystalised into an agitation for self-government. The Indian National Congress was founded in 1885 and constitutional reforms were made in 1892 and in 1909. The former raised the number of additional members in the Indian Legislative Council practically to sixteen and enabled some of them to be elected, to all intents and purposes, by the provincial legislative councils. The latter were also enlarged by the addition of more non-official members. Both the Supreme and the Provincial legislative councils were given limited rights to interpellate the executive, move resolutions and discuss the annual financial statements. The Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909 carried the line of development further; raised the numerical strength of the supreme legislative council to sixty-nine and that of the Madras, Bombay, Bengal, United Provinces, Eastern Bengal and Assam, the Punjab, and Burma legislative councils to forty-seven, forty-seven, fifty-two, forty-seven, forty-one, twenty-five and sixteen, respectively. While some of those members were nominated officials or non-officials, the others were elected through various constituencies. The Government of India Act, 1919, framed in pursuance of the

policy of the progressive realisation of responsible government. announced on the 20th of August, 1917, registered a tangible advance. It created a second chamber at the centre, the Council of State, consisting of sixty members of whom thirty-four were elected on a high property franchise. It enlarged the lower chamber, the Legislative Assembly, which came to consist of 145 members of whom 104 were elected through various constituencies. The financial and legislative powers of the legislatures were enlarged though ultimate control was retained by the Executive which was not responsible to the legislature. The Act of 1919 enlarged the provincial legislative councils, expanded their powers, and transferred a number of subjects like agriculture, local self-government, education and public health to ministers responsible to the legislatures. The number of voters for the Central Assembly fell below a million and a half, but that of provincial voters exceeded five millions, so the dawn of the 20th century brought on the horizon the prospect not only of a larger share in the public services but also in the formulation of policy. The ferment that followed the Viceroyalty of Lord Curzon (1898-1905)—the great pro-consul who partitioned Bengal—seemed to suggest that the people had struck the tents and were on the march again. Democracy was no longer a remote contingency ; it seemed to be an invading reality.

DIFFICULTIES OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT

It will be observed that the movement for national independence was merged into that for self-government and established itself on the dogma of democracy. Hence arose a new set of problems calling for a new set of adjustments. If government is the most difficult of all arts, self-government is the most difficult of all forms of government. It seeks to build itself on the knowledge, judgment, integrity and public spirit of the common man, but encounters an initial handicap in the apathy which enables the assertive few to play upon the prejudices

and manipulate the voting strength of the multitude: It presupposes an approximation to homogeneity adequate to ensure agreement on fundamentals, but it has to reckon with the danger of party erecting the merely important or even the trivial to the rank of fundamentals. It is grounded in faith in the infinite worth of personality, practical recognition of the dignity of man as man, but diversities of sect or class may inhibit the development of the requisite attitudes. The prospects of democracy depend on the general level of education, character and habits of co-operation. But in the beginning long habituation to despotism renders it difficult to attain new adjustments in terms of freedom. Success in popular government is partly a function of instructed and disinterested leadership, but leadership merely sums up an intricate interaction between the politically conscious minority and the inert majority. A leader is, like everything else, a social product.

PERSISTENCE OF NEGATIVE GOVERNMENT IN INDIA

In Europe the transition from monarchic or aristocratic absolutism to popular government was accompanied by the transformation of negative into positive government. That is to say, the state confined itself no longer to defence, order, justice and other elementary functions but undertook actively to promote mass education, economic welfare, public health, social insurance, etc. India, however, has lingered in the negative stage of government. The constituent Acts of 1862, 1909, 1919, and 1935 registered very slow progress in self-government and enfranchisement. But the intervals were not used to prepare the ground for fresh experiments. Since the third quarter of the 19th century, compulsory primary education had been recognised as one of the duties of governments in Europe and the United States, but in India the Government always pleaded lack of funds and has been content with less than 10 per cent. literacy. The human mind is so constituted

that it cannot rest content with suspensions of judgment; it yearns for positive opinions and creates meaningful wholes. Denial of knowledge and training leaves it at the mercy of inherited dogmas, current prejudices and alluring catchwords, a prey to faction and demagogy. The masses are heirs to a rich culture; they possess commonsense and integrity and appreciate the merits of mutual aid in common life. But illiteracy imprisons their minds and exposes them to theocratic and other forms of propaganda.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

In Europe the progress of democratic government synchronised with a rise in the standard of life by three or four hundred per cent. through the application of science to production and transport. But in India no effective attempt was made to mechanise agriculture; the land economy remained almost primitive; only a few factories were established in a few towns; the masses were sunk in poverty; large numbers lived on the verge of starvation and the national income stood at less than 50 or 60 rupees a year per head. Poverty consigned social life to a low level and repressed the incentive to a proper share in the higher cultural and political activities of the country.

INADEQUATE SHARE IN DEFENCE

Self-government presupposes, in ultimate analysis, a capacity for self-defence. But a generation ago, India depended for defence entirely on the British Navy, a small British Army and a larger British-officered Indian Army. An artificial distinction between martial and non-martial classes has begun to be effaced only under the pressure of the war of 1939. Nor have the people yet had the opportunity to acquire that robust confidence and sturdy self-respect which accompany full preparedness for defence.

THE PARADOX OF DEMOCRACY

All this may be urged, and has often been urged, as a powerful argument against self-government, but in the historical context it also constitutes a plea for a radical change in the system of government responsible for such a state of things. Here is the paradox of democracy which has appeared in the history of many countries. Its success depends on conditions which it alone can bring about. Here is apparent the mutuality of cause and effect. The old order of illiteracy, poverty and defencelessness is an obstacle to, as well as a justification for progress towards, self-government. Here, as elsewhere, things move in circles. Self-government is a break in the old vicious circle at a very important point. Statesmanship dictates a simultaneous attack on poverty and ignorance.

THE IMPRACTICABILITY OF ARISTOCRATIC GOVERNMENT

The transition from autocratic to democratic government has often been mediated in history by enlightened aristocratic government. The Indian Government was actually led by conservatism and British analogy to call the landlords in large numbers through weightage to the legislative chambers. Experience, however, demonstrated that they lacked the requisites of leadership. The inevitable assumption of all power by an efficient and centralised bureaucracy in the middle of the nineteenth century had exposed large feudal holdings to the drawbacks of functionless property. The course of history had not trained the landlords to those habits of public life which enabled the British aristocracy to shoulder the responsibility of constitutional government for more than two hundred years. The new opportunities of higher education had mostly escaped them. The system of land tenure in North India was feudalistic and weighed heavily on the tenantry creating an antagonism which ruled the landholders out of the chances of national

leadership. They were content to set up class organisations for the protection of their own interests. Genuine conservatism, grounded in respect for traditions and in gradualist concepts of national progress, can be a stabilising force in politics and can alternate in power with radicalism as in England, but defence of privilege *qua* privilege generates a faction, not a party and, if it contrives to acquire political influence, paves the way for revolution.

PAUCITY OF COMMERCIAL WEALTH

Aristocracy has in modern times often strengthened itself by alliance with industrial and commercial wealth, but the big industry had made so little progress in India by the first decade of the present century that there was scarcely a plutocracy in existence to support an aristocracy.

THE EDUCATED MIDDLE CLASS

Public life was thus left mainly to the educated middle class which possessed leisure, and ambition, keen intellectual vigour, receptivity and breadth of outlook. It was still too small in numbers—knowledge of English being confined to less than two millions—and, as the events after 1918 proved, it was possible for great leaders to appeal over its head to a wider public. Nevertheless, the intelligentsia was growing and, if education had been rapidly pushed forward, might have acquired a very strong position in public affairs. The natural tendency of higher education to isolate its votaries from the masses is accentuated in India by the foreign medium of instruction. But it is partly counteracted by ties of caste and creed and a wider appeal of patriotism. Economically, the intelligentsia represents a gradation of wealth and poverty and, in the absence of large-scale industrialisation, concentrates on the public services and the learned professions. Hence it suffers from an internal contradiction ; it depends for its livelihood on a system

which it aspires to transform. Favourable prospects of employment were open to it in the beginning of the present century, but its growth outran industrial expansion, and chronic unemployment has plunged its youth into gloom often bordering on despair. An equally serious aspect of the economic plight has been the scramble among the communities for the few available posts and a consequent deterioration in their relations.

DEFICIENCIES IN INDIAN EDUCATION

Education in India has failed to keep abreast of new theories and experiments which have transformed the school in Western and Northern Europe as well as in the United States. Indian education has never been adequately psychologised, and in its higher grades it was, until lately, too literary, and extended but a meagre recognition to the claims of the physical and the social sciences. It was haphazard in growth, lacking in social direction and outlook. Accordingly, it did not always produce a Socratic temper and rigorous discipline. Some of its products found themselves cut off from the traditional moorings without being able to catch up with the European tradition as an alternative. The uprooting affected their patriotism and public spirit adversely. But there were others who nursed a genuine aspiration for the freedom and greatness of their country. Ignorance of foreign languages, other than English, was an obstacle to a thorough understanding of modern ideas, movements and, especially, of the course of international affairs. But educated India had made up for the deficiency through foreign travel and began to surmount that unfamiliarity with world conditions which had been the central cause of Indian defeats from the 11th to the 19th centuries. The educated Indian, at the dawn of the present century, was beginning to perceive more and more clearly that, with self-government on the horizon, revivalism was rapidly exhausting its inspirational value, that the golden age could be translated from the past

anchor in Shri Krishna's gospel of disinterested action, struggle and heroism buttressed by right knowledge of soul and salvation. That was the quintessence of Hindu philosophy. Some nationalists, though not all, in Maharashtra found inspiration in the life of Sivaji and the renaissance that had preceded his phenomenal rise to power in the seventeenth century. The Hindu stamp of revivalism was scarcely calculated to attract Musalmans to the national banner.

THE MUSLIM REACTION

On the other hand, the partial success of the National movement could not fail to awaken the Muslims to the need of a well-defined policy. Their reaction to the concatenation of circumstances took the form of a demand for special safeguards and as large a share in the devolution of power as was commensurate with their position, importance and aspirations. These tendencies were accentuated into new antagonisms by the institution of separate electorates in 1909.

THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY

The root of the matter lies in the search for security which is fundamental to politics. The innate quest of the individual and the family for security in the supply of food, clothing and shelter is one of the prime reasons for the emergence of the state. The search of states for security is one of the governing factors in international affairs. The search of groups and associations for security, economic, cultural and religious, supplies the tissue of domestic politics. It finds its sanction in power or a share in power. Politics, therefore, revolve largely round security rooted in power; much depends on the manner in which security is guaranteed and power exercised. Institutions that assist pursuit of security in common and exercise of power in unison foster the General Will, a disinterested regard for

the common welfare. All that favours an isolationist search for security, and therefore for power, makes for inter-group conflict.

A GREEK ILLUSTRATION

The inauguration of self-government has sometimes found a people divided against itself and pursuing security along conflicting lines. In those circumstances the first task of statesmen has been to bring the search for security to a common plane. For instance, the Athenian statesman Cleisthenes perceived at the close of the sixth century B.C. that the dissensions among the wealthy families and among the men of the hills, the plains and the sea-shore were a hindrance to democratic government. He brought them together through a new grouping in new tribes for political purposes and led them to rub shoulders together, to outgrow the differences and acquire unity of political experience.

UNITY AND DIVERSITY

A religious or social cleavage must be recognised in politics, but it is unsafe to make it the foundation of a superstructure and to give a separatist turn to the search for security and power. Corporate life cannot be built on the basis of differences. The art of creative politics consists in opening new avenues of co-operation and integrating the differences into a new synthesis. The electoral misgivings voiced by the Muslim League on its foundation in 1906 might have been met to the satisfaction of all at the time through the proportional representation which had been extolled by John Stuart Mill as early as 1861. More than three hundred schemes of proportionality had since been worked out and a few of them were actually in operation in many elections in the United States, Switzerland, Belgium, Scandinavia and other countries. The system was quite capable of modification so as to allow a stipulated weightage to minorities

in India. It could have furnished all the safeguards deemed necessary at the time and yet opened avenues of collaboration in politics. Or, general electorates with reservation of seats for the Musalmans might have amply met the needs of the situation and at the same time brought the communities nearer and nearer with every extension of the franchise. The gulf that yawned between them in 1906 or 1909 admitted of easy abridgment. But the plan that was actually embodied in the Reforms of 1909 was that of entirely separate electorates for Muslims and non-Muslims.

SEPARATE ELECTORATES

John Morley, whose name as Secretary of State for India is associated with the Reforms of 1909, once observed that what strikes deep in politics strikes deep all round. Separate electorates promptly reinforced all the disintegrating tendencies, all the separatist elements of revivalism, and, in fact, became their political counterpart. Joint electorates would have favoured modernist forces and progress on nationalist lines. As it was, revivalism and separate electorates supplemented each other and favoured a cultural and political *milieu* on the separatist basis. The consequences unfolded themselves with the remorseless march of a Greek tragedy. The year that followed the Reforms found a Hindu meeting at Allahabad resolving to establish an All-India Hindu Sabha. Separate electorates began the habit of regarding the Hindus and the Musalmans as distinct political entities. The system freed the majority representatives from the obligation of canvassing the support of the minorities and more than neutralised the advantages of the weightage. It enfeebled the capacity of every group to throw the centre of gravity outside itself and protect its interests in the national context. It loosened the control which considerations of general welfare should exercise on the course of affairs. It hampered the growth of public opinion as distinct from sectional opinion. Co-operation, eliminated from the polling

booth, was rendered more and more difficult in the legislature and in public life as a whole. The poison worked steadily. In 1916 it interposed difficulties, though it could not prevent the Lucknow Pact, between the Congress and the Muslim League. If nationalists won the general, that is, practically Hindu constituencies, it was because the majority community naturally finds it easier to cultivate nationalism. But they had to respect many prejudices. Besides, a number of Hindu communalists as distinct from nationalists were always returned by non-Muslim constituencies. The Muslim constituencies quite as naturally rang with cries of danger to religion, language and culture and need of protection in all possible ways. The Hindu reaction conjured up a danger to Hindu rights, stigmatised the Congress as pro-Muslim and looked upon compromise as surrender. Brooding converts a craving for protection into offensive conflict. As the separate electorate stabilised itself, the sense of disintegration grew more and more intense and the ideal of social justice had to fight a losing battle against the longing for privilege and predominance.

NON-CO-OPERATION AND KHILAFAT

The events that followed the last war ultimately brought out, though at first they obscured, the full consequences of separate electorates. The post-war wave of idealism and aspiration, Muslim agitation against the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, Hindu sympathy with the defeated Asiatic state and common resentment at the martial law regime in 1919 in the Punjab, resulted in a marvellous concordat between the two communities in 1919-22. But one of the most significant features about it was the boycott of the legislatures reorganised by the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919, and, therefore, a boycott of separate electorates, as an item in non-co-operation. It fell to Mahatma Gandhi and the Khilafat leaders to awaken to political life millions who were either disfranchised or were

persuaded to abstain from exercise of the franchise. The wider public just ushered into politics consisted of the comparatively prosperous petty zamindars, peasants, shopkeepers and high grade labourers. The centre of gravity shifted from the intelligentsia to this lower middle class in the sense that leadership has thenceforward rested on its support, and policy has been shaped in great measure in accordance with its ethos and its atmosphere. The enlargement of the public, that is to say, the wider diffusion of political consciousness, constituted a qualitative change, a redistribution of social power, and introduced a new style into public life. Those who were not fit for it by conviction, training or habit had to form small parties of their own, to play the role of advisers or to retire from public life. The rest of the educated class fell into line with policies framed by great leaders with an eye on the vaster clientelê. Mass meetings served the purpose of something like plebiscites and sustained by their enthusiasm a somewhat autocratic type of leadership. In the case of Mahatma Gandhi the following was nation-wide, and homage poured in from the outside world to raise him to an impregnable position.

POLITICAL IMMATURITY

But the new-comers were politically immature because of long habituation to subjection and to small-scale interests. Political immaturity, that is, an imperfect acceptance of political obligations and a ready acquiescence in rule or leadership from above, has been a characteristic of whole nations and classes and is writ large, for instance, over the modern history of Italy, Germany and Japan. It is found among the masses, to a greater or lesser degree, in every country. A living sense of the state, of its position and functions in the constitution of society, is awakened and sustained, against the pressure of smaller organisations, only by political education or a long tradition of responsible government. Political education was the immediate

need of the larger public which had begun to interest itself in politics after 1918 in India. But it was not forthcoming, in any adequate measure, from the Government or from the existing political organisations. The former was too rigid and bureaucratic and would neither rapidly universalise general education nor associate any large number of people with it through a network of local and provincial committees of an advisory character. The popular leaders were, above all, agitators and welcomed the new-comers, primarily as a large, perhaps an irresistible, reinforcement to their campaigns. The resultant training pertained to methods of agitation rather than to those of responsibility. For the rest the people were left to themselves to find their own bearings in politics. The wider the public, the simpler becomes the approach to it and the greater is the susceptibility to catchwords.

SPIRITUALISM IN POLITICS

The Hindus were attracted and hypnotised by the spiritualism which Mahatma Gandhi has sought to introduce into politics and which seems progressively to have deepened in himself. To a perfect tolerance the Mahatma joins a certain eclecticism ; he has often expressed his warm admiration for the Prophet and the Holy Quran ; his autobiography, *My Experiments with Truth*, testifies to the influence exerted on him by Christianity, especially through Count Tolstoy. But the fact remains that the Mahatma's spiritualism is grounded in the theology of Hinduism and the ethics of Jainism. Eminent authority maintains that there is nothing contrary to Islam in the ideals of simple life and the spinning-wheel. Nevertheless, there seems to be something mysteriously Hindu about them. At any rate they fit into the context of a wholesale Hindu revival. Non-violence could be adopted by any one as policy, but to preach it as a religious tenet, as a principle binding under all circumstances, and to invite suffering on oneself as a method of changing the opponent's

heart, had the appearance of Hindu or rather Jain and Buddhist inspiration. There was no getting away from the historical fact that the Prophet Mohammad had engaged in wars, though of a defensive character. The political creed of non-violence spread further and further, and soon the time came when the Mahatma became the centre of something like a sect and the Gandhian way of life acquired something like sanctity. The Khilafat movement had already deepened the religious tinge in Muslim politics. Like revivalism, one spiritualism evokes another and a theological discord is added to the political feud. All politics stand in need of spiritualisation in the sense of moralisation, that is to say, permeation with the principles of truth, sincerity, disinterestedness and humanitarianism. But spiritualism beyond them tends to reproduce the religious atmosphere, dogma and ceremonial in politics. It smacks of a reversion to theocracy and is doubly dangerous in a country which follows more than one religion. It may be that all religions, if properly understood, would exert a unifying and harmonious influence, but the crucial fact is that religions are not likely to be properly understood in a world where everything is liable to be misunderstood.

PARTING OF THE WAYS

The dual spiritualism was fraught with awkward possibilities. Nevertheless, if the Congress and the Muslim League could have continued on the path of legislative non-co-operation, they might have risen above much of the communalism and avoided a clash. The pressure of events, however, brought them both into constitutionalism and elections. It was the juxtaposition of a bifurcated revivalism and spiritualism with separate electorates that complicated the political situation. The Congress had so far been content with general influence over politics and leadership of the nationalist movement, but on New Year's Day in 1923 there arose within it a parliamentary Swarajist wing.

The special session of the Congress at Delhi in September 1923 formally suspended the previous propaganda against council entry. The Swarajists contested the elections as a party in November 1923 and showed themselves the largest and best organised group in the country. The Swaraj party became the council section of the Congress by virtue of the Calcutta Pact of November 1924 and was finally merged into the Congress at the Cawnpore session in December 1925. Except for a brief period of civil disobedience from 1930 to 1933, the Congress has ever since been a factor of the first magnitude in parliamentary activity. But its very success drew it into the vortex of separate electorates and separatist politics and exposed its nationalism to misunderstanding. It is needless to speculate whether it would have been the wiser course to keep aloof from elections until separate electorates had been modified or until the Congress had become as representative of the Musalmans as of the Hindus. The fact remains that separatism could now work much more extensively and much more powerfully. The franchise had been extended from a negligible number in 1909 to more than seven millions in 1919 as part of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms.

THE GULF WIDENS

On the morrow of the Second Reforms Act in England in 1867, Robert Lowe observed that they must educate their masters. In India, however, the importance of education for the electorate has never been adequately realised. The wider public has been exposed to all the separatist influences of the electoral system and has been infected with the communal virus. The extension of the franchise in 1919 served, after the brief interlude which lasted until 1922, to widen the gulf between the Hindus and the Musalmans. Finally, the wider enfranchisement enacted in 1935 brought more than 36 millions of the population of British India under separatist influences. It is

safe to prophesy that adult suffrage on the basis of separate electorates would complete the estrangement in every town and every village. It is a fundamental, though fairly common, mistake to suppose that the enfranchisement of the masses still living in peace and amity would facilitate agreement and concord. On that supposition rests the plea for a constituent assembly elected on the basis of adult suffrage. Human nature, however, does not work in such a simple and innocent manner. Its expression always takes the form of adjustment to the environment, including the subjective environment, which it encounters. Enfranchisement would bring the masses forthwith into the flaming atmosphere of phrase and feeling which separate electorates have generated. Nor should it be forgotten that antagonisms which arise in the city spread quickly to rural areas. The domination of the countryside by the city is one of the characteristics of modern civilisation; the city seems to insist on everything conforming to itself. In British India slightly more than 90 per cent. of the population live in villages, but they are powerfully influenced by less than 10 per cent. residing in the cities. Adult suffrage may recommend itself as a means of awakening self-respect, of political education, of mobilising all the intellectual and moral resources for the public good and of securing the consultation of all interests and standpoints in government. But that makes it all the more necessary to find a way out of an electoral arrangement which would land any country into acute civil strife. Nowhere is the sense of political obligation keener and more widely diffused than in England. Yet if separate electorates were introduced for Catholics, Protestants, Presbyterians and Nonconformists, they would not take more than a generation to rouse acute antagonisms. Introduce the system into the United States and the greatest of republics would soon resound with the battle-cries of all the races and nationalities of Europe.

CHAPTER III

POWER AND POLITICS

PROCRASTINATION

THE Government of India Act of 1919 envisaged an inquiry and a revision of the constitution every ten years. But the diarchy which it established in the provinces lingered till 1937 and the arrangements made at the centre are, with two or three changes, still in operation. It is not germane to our argument to review the Simon Commission (1927-30), the three Round Table Conferences (1930-32), the Parliamentary White Paper (1933) and the Joint Parliamentary Committee (1933-34). The Government of India Act of 1935 was enforced in the provinces in 1937, but a federation of the Indian States and the provinces which it contemplated was not set up owing to lukewarmness of the government, reluctance on the part of the Princes, and opposition both from the Muslim League as well as the National Congress, though from divergent standpoints. Neither in England nor in India did there exist any statesmanship endowed with the will and the capacity to reconcile the differences or to impose a solution of its own. Indeed, the British cabinets from 1929 to 1939, whose record in affairs nearer home—in diplomacy, in appeasement, and in defence—now appears so tragic, could scarcely show vision and understanding in settling the problems of a dependency six thousand miles away. The deterioration in India appears, in the wider perspective, as part of a deterioration in the affairs of the British Empire since the economic depression of 1929-32. Apart from the pressure of the war of 1939, there have been other causes at work on the British side to hold up progress in India. A government responsible in ultimate analysis to a country six thousand miles away, does not feel that urge for popular welfare that makes for continuous

adaptation. It tends to be impervious to the claims of political advance. Its despotic and bureaucratic character generates a sense of insecurity and inspires excessive caution and a constant fear of 'leaps in the dark.' It clings to the *status quo* so long as it can and elevates it to the rank of a sacred principle in face of an emergency like a war. Nor is it too impossible to forget that the Indo-British problem is part of the crucial and world-wide problem of the relations of the white and coloured races. Behind it lies the yet deeper problem—the moral and spiritual problem—of lifting human affairs to a plane of universal co-operation and mutual aid. The failure of the dominant Atlantic civilisation to rise above force as a principle in human relationship and to transcend the limitations of race and colour is reflected in the long delay in Indian reform.

ANOMALIES AND COMPLEXES

The policy of drift has been responsible for grave anomalies in the political situation. The British Government declared for the progressive realisation of responsible government in 1917; more than twenty-seven years have passed, but it has neither completed the progress nor cancelled the declaration. It pronounced in favour of a Federation in 1930. Fifteen years later the Federation is still in the region of discussion. A series of postponements reached their logical culmination, on the outbreak of the war, in the practical repudiation of the central parts of the Government of India Act of 1935. True, in July 1941 and again in August 1942 the Executive Council of the Viceroy was strengthened by the addition of new Indian members, so that it now consists of sixteen members (including the Viceroy) of whom eleven are Indians; but the change has left untouched the real question of the transfer of power to the Indian people and the consequent responsibility of the Executive to the elective legislature. The proposals presented on behalf of the British Cabinet by Sir Stafford Cripps and discussed by

the leaders or working committees of various parties at Delhi in March and April 1942 turned out to be unacceptable to the Congress as well as the Muslim League and were withdrawn by the British Government. The prolonged stagnation was responsible for the outbreak in August next of what was described as a rebellion by the Home Member of the Government of India. With the return of tranquillity, Mr C. Rajagopalachariar offered to visit England and requested an interview with Mahatma Gandhi in jail to explore possibilities of a settlement. Both the request and the offer were turned down. A press communique issued from New Delhi on the 13th of November made it clear that "the decision recently taken on Mr Rajagopalachariar's request to be allowed to see Mr Gandhi represents the considered policy of the Government of India." Replying to an interpellation in the House of Commons on the 17th of November, the Secretary of State for India stated in the course of a written reply that the British Government saw "no advantage in Mr Rajagopalachariar visiting this country."

The British Government declined to use the opportunity afforded by Mahatma Gandhi's three weeks' fast commencing on the 10th of February 1943 to release him or the other Congress leaders. Shortly afterwards the American President's representative, Mr William Phillips, was refused permission to meet the Mahatma. Finally, the Government of India turned down the Mahatma's request to forward a short letter from himself to Mr M. A. Jinnah, President of the All-India Muslim League. The Government communique issued at New Delhi on the 26th of May, stated that, "In accordance with their known policy in regard to correspondence or interviews with Mr Gandhi the Government of India have decided that this letter cannot be forwarded and have so informed Mr Gandhi and Mr Jinnah. They are not prepared to give facilities for political correspondence or contact to a person detained for promoting an illegal mass movement which he has not disavowed and thus gravely embarrassing India's war effort at a critical time. It

rests with Mr Gandhi to satisfy the Government of India that he can safely be allowed once more to participate in the public affairs of the country and until he does so the disabilities from which he suffers are of his own choice."

Next day, the Secretary of State for India stated in the House of Commons that the Government of India had no intention of staging a trial of Mr Gandhi and other detained Congress leaders. Mahatma Gandhi was released on the 6th of May 1944 unconditionally, but "solely on medical grounds." Nor was the Mahatma's release accompanied by that of the other Congress leaders. Replying to an interpellation in the House of Commons, the Secretary of State for India continued to insist on the Congress recanting its policy. The Mahatma, on the other hand, allowed it to be understood on the 31st of May that he wasn't prepared to withdraw the Congress resolution of the 9th of August 1942. In response to Mahatma Gandhi's subsequent feelers for political accommodation, the Viceroy wrote to him on the 15th of August 1944 to say, *inter alia*, that it was impossible during the war to make any constitutional changes calculated to set up a national government responsible to the Central Assembly. Finally, the conversation accompanied by correspondence that took place between Mahatma Gandhi and Mr M. A. Jinnah from the 9th to the 26th of September broke down because the former declined to accept the two-nation theory and insisted on some kind of central administration for defence, foreign policy and other important matters, for the whole country. A conciliation committee set up by the standing committee of the Non-Party Conference at Delhi on the 19th of November, proceeded to explore possibilities of settlement and circularised political leaders. But the president of the Muslim League informed Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, Chairman of the Conciliation Committee, on the 14th of December that he could not recognise the committee or the Non-Party Conference or its standing committee and declined a meeting.

To sum up, the government of India has been an open question since 1927 and is still an open question. Such a situation would in any country in the world suffice to accentuate all the old jealousies and differences and to create new ones. Wounds that admit of rapid healing become septic through delay. The din of claims and counter-claims diffuses a sense of insecurity. For politics there is profound significance in Alfred Adler's thesis, in contradistinction to Freud, that complexes are due not to the past but to fear of the future. Besides, a consciousness of unfulfilled possibilities always generates a feeling of frustration and oppression. Psychological complexes are writ large over Indian politics since 1930. Fear of the future casts a shadow of suspicion over every move on the part of others.

INADEQUATE SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY

A settlement seemed to be in sight in 1930-1931 between the British Government, the Indian Princes, the National Congress, the Muslim League and others. But it has become more difficult with the lapse of every year. Procrastination has thrown the entire political fabric of India into the melting pot and unsettled the minds of all. Interminable discussion serves as a golden opportunity for superficial plans of reconstruction inspired by quest of power and for raising demands to a higher and higher pitch in the hope of striking the most favourable bargain. Procrastination has evoked intransigence, and a reciprocity of cause and effect has been established between the two. The sense of responsibility and the will to concord alike have been adversely affected.

HIATUS IN PARTY DEVELOPMENT

The long delay in the inauguration of responsible government at the centre has also created a hiatus in party development in

the country. Freedom, like religion, is one of the supreme enthusiasms that move the human heart. Once the vital issue of political freedom has emerged into consciousness, it holds the field until it is settled. Until the transfer of power to the Indian people there can be only one majority party in the country—namely, that which offers resistance of some kind or other to the existing government. Its appeal in the name of freedom will carry all before it. No amount of ability, judgment or sagacity will avail its opponents to secure an appreciable degree of support with the majority community. The central question of political independence will inevitably be introduced into the provincial and local elections. On the other hand, claims for a share of the power that never seems to come will tend to consolidate the Musalmans into a united whole to confront the British Government and the Hindus alike. Long delays have thus converted Indian politics into a contest for power—the British Government reluctant to part with power, the Princes seeking to federate without surrendering anything out of their autonomy, the Indian nationalists bent on securing the whole of power and reluctant to meet half-way what they described as communal demands, the Muslim League striving for as much power for Musalmans as possible, the Hindu Sabha intent on the rights of the majority and proclaiming them with an uncompromising rigidity calculated to rouse Muslim suspicions, and minorities, old and new, claitning weightages. In such an atmosphere real parties cannot develop on the basis of economic or social matters. The struggle for power imparts fixity and rigidity to the contesting groups and draws all political ambition into their camps. Every one feels as if he were caught in a storm and must veer with the wind. A Muslim feels that he has no future outside the Muslim League. A Hindu, if constrained by circumstances to remain outside the fold of the National Congress, perceives little prospect of founding a real alternative party and finds rest or foothold only in the Hindu Sabha. Party sweep of such dimensions stigmatises doubt or

opposition as treason and imposes a tight discipline to consolidate the two or three rival organisations. Thus the development of parties in India has been subject to a hiatus which does not allow economic and other issues their due weight in politics.

ORTHODOX PARLIAMENTARISM

It is worth-while in this background to examine the ideas and movements which have been operating especially since 1937 to bring Indian politics to the present impasse. In the elections of 1937 the Congress won a large majority in six provinces—Bombay, Madras, the C.P., the U.P., Bihar and Orissa—and formed purely Congress Governments in all of them and within a few months in a seventh province, the N.-W.F.P. It declined coalition with the Muslim League mainly for two reasons, *viz.*, parliamentary orthodoxy and an expectation of winning the Muslim masses to its banner on the basis of a common programme. Anglo-Saxon democracies have functioned for long on the basis of homogeneous cabinets. Coalitions have been few and not always happy. "England does not love coalitions," said Disraeli. In India a coalition ministry might have failed to present a united front to the Governor or to resign collectively on an all-India issue like the terms of participation in the war. The dominant mood in the Congress was that of fighting British imperialism, so that it was reluctant to loosen the ties of discipline in a manner which a coalition often renders necessary. There was a feeling that there could be only one people's party so long as complete independence was not attained, that the Congress was that party and that it could absorb, but not coalesce with, any other group. For the rest, it was out to reform the country and was afraid that a coalition might weaken the agrarian, temperance and other programmes. Orthodox parliamentarism led the Congress leaders to forget that the one-party theory, even if true of political agitation, was not, in the absence of an

accomplished revolution, applicable to ministerial office. The change from extra-constitutional action to governmental responsibility to which the Congress assented in 1937 was a change of scale and methods of the profoundest significance and called for a fresh evaluation and arrangement of political forces. The country was passing through a crisis, and crises have usually been surmounted even in England through coalitions, for instance in 1915, 1931 and 1940. Cabinet homogeneity really presupposes a durable two-party system which only the Anglo-Saxon race has really succeeded in maintaining—not without jerks—owing to its exceptionally strong sense of discipline and of discrimination between essentials and non-essentials, owing to the gradualness of a constitutional development dating back to the thirteenth century, and owing to peculiar traditions of public life. France and other countries which embarked on parliamentary government rather suddenly in the nineteenth century, began and retained a multiple party system and, therefore, coalition cabinets. This entailed frequent resignations or dissolutions, weakened the executive, hampered the formulation and execution of long-term policies and led to a trafficking in votes and favours. Nevertheless, this system worked for many decades, and its eventual breakdown in 1940 was due mainly to causes beyond itself.

It is obvious that homogeneous and coalition cabinets alike offered advantages and disadvantages in the Indian provinces in 1937. The balance, however, was in favour of the former; a flexible policy would have allowed adequate expression to the forces already in occupation of the political field and facilitated their integration with the public interest. The majority 'principle' is at bottom not an ethical maxim but a rule of expediency and has always to be so interpreted as to command minority affirmation. Orthodox parliamentarism, however, carried the day in 1937; the Congress cabinets in six provinces included Muslim Congressmen but excluded the Muslim League as an organisation from a share in power.

MISAPPLICATION OF "ECONOMIC DETERMINISM"

It is worth while to stress that the Congress leaders, while declining coalition with the Muslim League as a party, had no intention of excluding the Musalmans as such from power. They expected their economic programme to rally the Muslim masses to their political creed and thus to create a nation-wide party above all sectarianism and denominationalism. They were not Marxists, but like many other socialists and non-socialists they had been influenced by the materialist conception of history—the economic determinism—which has made Karl Marx (1818-83) as great an influence in social thought as Charles Darwin. Marx published *The Communist Manifesto*, still the most compact and authoritative statement of the Communist creed, jointly with Friedrich Engels in 1848 and then worked intensely for nearly twenty years in the British Museum on *Capital*. He substituted the economic factor or rather the mode of production for the Absolute of the Hegelian dialectic as the principle of development and concluded that forms of social and political organisation, law and ethics, art and literature are all determined in accordance with the operation of economic forces. Long afterwards Engels admitted that he and Marx had been led to exaggerate the role of the economic factor. Philosophically, the real mistake had lain in regarding the economic impact as almost a detached and antecedent, instead of an organic and integrated, factor in society. Communism suffers more than other 'isms' from the fallacy of ascribing to a single factor what is due to a complex and inter-acting multiplicity of causes. So resulted an under-estimate of the creative mental energies, the reason and the imagination, the emotions and the sentiments, a misreading of the influence of race, religion, sheer prejudice and tradition. The Marxian ideology was so rigid that Lenin, in spite of his earlier insistence on orthodoxy, was constrained, on assuming power in Russia, to depart from it in several important respects. In India it is especially necessary to beware

of being entrapped in any of the divergent interpretations of Karl Marx which bewildered Marx himself during his lifetime and led him once to observe that he was not a Marxist. Behind it all remains the disturbing fact that the socialist or communist ideology has been worked out in Europe mainly on the basis of European experience and does not admit of ready application to a different environment. In India the vital principle of socialism—mass uplift to the highest point of welfare and culture—still awaits its Karl Marx who in addition to first-hand investigation will shut himself up for at least twenty months in the Imperial Library at Calcutta and work out the implications with an eye on India's agricultural and industrial possibilities and suggest a strategy in full recognition of the lines, horizontal and vertical, across Indian society. This lack of adaptation is responsible not only for the extremely slow progress of socialism in India during the last twenty-five years, but also for fallacies fraught with dangerous possibilities. Indian leadership in future is likely to be socialist in sympathies and may run serious risk in the absence of a correct understanding of the principles and limitations of socialism. Unilinear ways of thinking may warp the Indian socialist's judgment on internal as well as external affairs. It was an over-simplification of the Marxian analysis to conclude in 1937 that an appeal to the economic interest would under all circumstances push aside the appeal in the name of religion, culture or political rights.

RELIGIOSITY *versus* SECULARITY

Indian statesmanship had to steer warily between the claims of religion and those of secularity. It was a difficult test. It was like walking on the edge of a razor to give religion its due weight in politics and yet to keep public life as secular as possible. It seemed like reconciling contradictions. Finally, separate electorates had much to answer for. They put the Hindu legislators out of touch with the currents of thought in Muslim

constituencies. Hindu politicians lacked that susceptibility to Muslim displeasure which only a reckoning with Muslim voters in joint elections could have induced. It was under the auspices of separate electorates that orthodox parliamentarism and misapplication of a communist tenet led to a decision in favour of homogeneous cabinets on the one hand and the Muslim mass contact campaign on the other. In the atmosphere of power politics an error of judgment was magnified by panic into a firm resolve to establish a Hindu Raj.

PAN-ISLAMISM

It was an old attachment to parliamentary orthodoxy and a new sympathy with socialism or communism that landed the Congress into antagonism with the Muslim League. Similarly, it was an old attachment to Pan-Islamism and a new observation of minority politics in Europe that landed the Muslim League into acute hostility against the Congress. Pan-Islamism, a creed of alliance, collaboration or solidarity among all the Muslim States or among Musalmans all over the world appears at first sight to be the political counterpart of the brotherhood of the faithful. Historically, the spread of Islam over three continents by the eighth century A.D. rendered it difficult to maintain the political unity of the Khilafat. In the thirteenth century the Abbasi'd Khilafat was subjected by the Mongols to a severe defeat from which it never recovered, but the idea of the Khilafat as a single spiritual power for the Islamic world survived to be embodied in the Ottoman Sultanate at Constantinople. Three centuries later it seemed to receive fresh vitality from the facilities of transport and communication. It became the foundation of the Pan-Islamism led by Sultan Abdul Hamid II. (1876-1908) and was used by the Turkish leaders to win the sympathies of all their co-religionists in the war of 1914-1918. Mustafa Kamal Pasha who created a nation-state in Turkey and sought to modernise the people abolished the

Khilafat in 1924, but that did not prevent him from sponsoring the movement for the solidarity of the Muslim-world known as Silsila-Jamalia-Vahdat Umam Islam under the auspices of Syed Jalil Ahmad Sinyusi. Two years later, there was held at Cairo a Khilafat Conference which was attended by an Indian delegation and which endeavoured to set up a Khalifa to be the head of an alliance of Muslim Nations. The attempt failed, but there was again a significant development when the Sheikh of Al Ahzar, the thousand-year old University of Cairo, revived the idea in favour of the young Egyptian monarch King Farouk, on January 30, 1939, on the occasion of one of his visits to the Quosoun Mosque in the presence of the Amir Hussain of Yemen and the Amirs Feisal and Khaled of Saudi Arabia.

DIFFICULTIES IN THE WAY OF PAN-ISLAMISM

The realisation of Pan-Islamism has been hampered for centuries and is still hampered, in spite of new facilities of communication, by the deserts and mountains which separate Muslim states from one another and which make them distinct geographical entities with divergent economic interests. A second important handicap is the division into at least three distinct races—the Semitic, the Turanian or Turkish and the Aryan or Iranian. There are at least four principal languages—Turkish, Arabic, Persian and Pushto, spoken between Egypt and Afghanistan. The Shia state of Iran is a sort of wedge driven into a predominantly Sunni block. In 1918 Pan-Islamism failed to assuage Arab particularisms and to prevent the disruption of the Ottoman Empire. Recently there has been a wave of anti-Semitism, that is anti-Arabism, in Turkey and in a milder form even in Iran. On the other side, there is a pro-Arabic movement in the Arabic-speaking Asiatic lands. Besides the progress of secularity and nationalism especially in Turkey and Egypt runs counter to the theological postulates of Pan-Islamism. Every one of the Muslim States in the Near East

and Middle East moves in a separate diplomatic orbit so that a close alliance or confederation among them has been extremely difficult. The Sadabad Pact signed in 1934 by Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan failed to mature into a real *entente*.

THE APPEAL OF PAN-ISLAMISM

Nevertheless, Pan-Islamism remains one of the many pan movements that constitute something like half-way houses between nationalism and cosmopolitanism. On the one hand, it is a broadening, even a humanit arian, influence. The hearts of Indian Muslims vibrated in sympathy with the Egyptian movement for independence during the present century, with Persia in her unequal struggle against the British and Russian encroachments in 1907, with Turkey in her dismemberment after the last war, with the Arabs of Palestine in their reaction against political and economic difficulties since 1921, and with Albania at the moment of her annexation by Italy in 1939. There is a psychological satisfaction, a feeling of pride and self-respect, in contemplation of lands peopled by co-religionists and, unlike India, enjoying independence. On the other hand, extra-territorial attachments weaken national patriotism. Indeed Sir Mohammad Iqbal, though himself the author of a patriotic and popular song in his earlier days, declared after his identification with Pan-Islamism that the idea of territorial patriotism was un-Islamic on the ground of inconsistency with the Brotherhood of the Faithful irrespective of race or clime. The enfeebling of patriotism exposes the Muslim attitude to the poison of power politics—gathering as much power as possible and bringing as much territory as possible under purely Muslim control. The extent to which this ambition can go is reflected in a recent pamphlet, *Confederacy of India*, by a “Punjabi” who pronounces a state composed of heterogeneous elements as alien to Islam, posits perfect isolation as indispensable to the development of an Islamic polity on the basis of an inseparable

union between religion and state, then perceives the impossibility of maintaining this ideal for long in an un-Islamic world and therefore concludes by forecasting that "we shall have to advocate a world revolution on Islamic lines."

THE GUARANTEE SYSTEM AND ITS FAILURE IN EUROPE

It was perhaps inevitable that the controversy over group adjustments in India should be influenced by similar debates in Europe. A militant nationalism created serious minority problems there in the nineteenth century by encouraging a policy of suppression and assimilation on the one hand and by reviving racial or nationalist feeling on the other. The post-war attempt to protect minorities took the form of international and constitutional guarantees of civil rights and for a while evoked a sympathetic response in India, but it broke down within a few years. Race sentiment, nationalistic fervour, extra-territorial patriotism, foreign intrigues, irredentism and treaty-revisionism have kept up antagonisms between majorities and minorities and led to serious domestic and international complications in several countries. The failure of the guarantee system in central and eastern Europe sapped the faith in its efficacy everywhere else. Unfortunately, the deeper cause of the tragedy, a false idea of nationality and a false equation of nationality with statehood, was not adequately understood in India or elsewhere. Minority movements took a more militant turn; grievances were presented and redress sought in a more uncompromising manner. There is a curious resemblance between the grievances and demands of the Muslims against the Hindus in 1937-39 and those of the Christians and the Shia Muslims against the Sunni majority in Syria in 1938-39.

THE EXAMPLE OF THE SUDETEN GERMANS

Above all, there is a striking parallel between the Sudeten movement in Czechoslovakia and the advocacy of partition in

India. The German minority which constituted 23.4 per cent. of the Czechoslovak population and was concentrated mainly in the three provinces of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, long agitated only for a larger share in administration and policy. But in response to the pan-Germanism embodied in the Nazi creed of neighbouring Germany, the Home Front, as the Sudeten German party led by Conard Henlein was called after 1933 and more definitely in 1935, began to think of frontier revision. No state in Europe had a cleaner record in minority policy than Czechoslovakia. At worst, it could only be charged with a few acts of omission and commission, specially in the years immediately following 1918. However, the Sudetens now accused it of oppressions and injustices without caring to prove the charges. Henceforward, an "atrocity" campaign became part of the technique of minority movements in Europe. The Sudeten party declined concessions offered by the Czech Government and went on raising its demands. Speaking at Carlsbad on the 24th of April 1938, Conard Henlein formulated eight points, *inter alia*, repudiating the very conception that there was a Czechoslovak State containing a German minority, demanding equality of status for the Sudeten Germans and the Czechs, a guarantee of this equality by recognition of the Sudeten Germans as a unified legal personality, and full autonomy in every department of life of the German area of Czechoslovakia, including full liberty to proclaim Germanism and adhesion to German ideology. On the 7th of June was submitted a memorandum (not published until the 19th of July) demanding reorganisation of the state into racial areas, virtual independence for each area and at the same time an equal voice in such central government as might remain. At last even the offer of home rule was declined and the Sudetenland, with overwhelming German, French and British support, seceded from Czechoslovakia and was incorporated into the German Reich in October 1938. The secession could not, however, form the last chapter in the story. It left the rest of

the country defenceless. Pan-Germanism is necessarily a brand of imperialism. In March 1939 it detached Slovakia from the dismembered state and annexed the rest of it. So the stage was set for the present war and Czech patriotism expects its conclusion to synchronise with the resurrection of Czech unity, it may be, as part of a larger federation but, at any rate, on a footing of equality and self-respect.

ITS INFLUENCE ON INDIA

The entire course of events was fully reported and closely observed in India, as elsewhere, because it brought Europe to the verge of war in September 1938, and convinced all in March 1939 that a world war had become unavoidable. The progress of the Sudeten demands from a larger share in administration and policy to a repudiation of minority status, the claim to separate nationhood, the denial of Czechoslovak unity, charges of atrocities and oppression unsupported by evidence, the demand for frontier revision, the advocacy of a virtual partition together with the claim of 50 per cent. share in the residual central organisation—all these features in the Sudeten movement in 1936-38 found their counterpart in the resolutions of the Muslim League in 1939-42. In fact, some of the phrases employed are identical.

PROVINCIAL REDISTRIBUTION IN INDIA

There was also much in recent developments in India to suggest a redrawing of the map. By the close of the nineteenth century the Indian provincial system seemed to have stabilised itself, but then began a process of redistribution which is not yet regarded by many as having come to an end. Lord Curzon created a new frontier province in 1901 and partitioned the admittedly too large presidency of Bengal in 1905, joining Eastern Bengal to Assam as a new province while leaving

Western Bengal united with Bihar and Orissa. The bifurcation convulsed Bengal to its foundations. The anti-partition agitation, however, told in a few years and a new distribution of provincial frontiers in eastern India was carried out so that Bihar and Orissa became a separate province and Western and Eastern Bengal were reunited to form a single presidency. At the same time, Delhi, to which the metropolis was shifted from Calcutta in 1912, became the nucleus of a new province. A complete overhauling of the provinces on the linguistic basis was suggested by many as an aid to the operation of the forthcoming parliamentary government and was accepted by the Congress for representation on its own party hierarchy. By 1937 Sind and Orissa had been officially separated from Bombay and Bihar respectively. The Andhra-desh, the Marathi C.P., the Hindustani C.P. and Kerala also aspired to separate provincial status, while a regrouping of the smaller Indian States seemed to be a corollary of their entry into the Federation which was contemplated in the Government of India Act of 1935. The long-drawn out, almost interminable, process might well suggest schemes of territorial redistribution of a yet more radical character to those who were being led by the conjuncture of events to search for security on a separatist basis.

THE DICTATORIAL TEMPER

In addition to parliamentary orthodoxy, misapplied socialist assumptions, Pan-Islamism and minority politics in Europe, there are other foreign influences of a more impalpable character which have affected the temper and trends of Indian politics. During the last twenty-eight years, monarchy or democracy has been supplanted by dictatorship in the majority of European states. It represents the political response to militarism and ardent nationalism or sectionalism, to the need of a complete mobilisation of resources and enthusiasm, or of rapid large-scale reform; it is a protest against a dilatory and antiquated

parliamentarism with its network of checks and balances. The dictatorship ranks as one of the most significant developments in the modern world; its adoption in countries so different as Soviet Russia, Kamalist Turkey, Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, among others, could not fail to arrest attention and prompt imitation in India and elsewhere. Indeed, some of the circumstances which favour this form of leadership are present in India. The modern dictatorship is pre-eminently a party dictatorship based on strict party ideology and discipline. Dictatorial methods have been facilitated in India by a transfer of the centre of gravity from the small intelligentsia to a much wider and more diffused public since 1919. Parties have become much more disciplined, but at the same time there has been a tendency towards the concentration of power in the hands of a few leaders. It is for them to open and close any negotiations with government or with other parties. They seek to control cabinets over the heads of the legislatures and electorates. They visit any internal divergence of a sharp character from the party programme with disciplinary punishment. They send forth reprimands and bulls of excommunication, challenges and ultimatums. The personal equation counts for so much that failure to rise to heights of comprehension, judgment, catholicity and disinterestedness can entail disaster for the time being.

DICTATORIAL PROGRAMMES

The European dictators dispose of vast resources and vast masses of men. They undertake stupendous tasks; they brandish mighty programmes with amazing confidence; they talk of new order in Europe and in the world; they disturb old frontiers and reshuffle the states. Some politicians in India who derive their inspiration from Europe are no longer content with the role of a Gladstone or a Gambetta; "the applause of listening senates to command" is but a feeble achievement. Ambitions expand to Napoleonic proportions, seeking to

re-fashion the whole life of society or to smash time-honoured political formations to pieces and found new states, confederations or empires.

MODERN PROPAGANDA

The dictatorial temper derives exquisite self-satisfaction from denunciation or ridicule of democracy. But it is significant of the intrinsic importance of popular support under modern conditions that Cæsarism builds itself on that type of propaganda which consists in rousing mass emotion and adapts itself to mass prejudice in all its variety. It flourishes on the decay of faith in those forms of government which, like parliamentarism, are based on reason and discussion. The propaganda machine employs the press and the platform, the pamphlet and a vast deal of apparently scholarly literature to manufacture opinion and impose dogmas according to political convenience. As a result, the shores of European speculation to-day are strewn with the wrecks of historical analysis and philosophic doctrine; the air is thick with raw and immature schemes of reconstruction on the basis of race, religion, culture, nationality, economic cleavage and class supremacy. In the present crisis of transition Europe speaks with a myriad voices, specially on psychology, economics and politics. Her life is full of contradictions, reckless experiments and atavisms, liable to mislead anyone who fails to keep his critical faculties fully awake or to remind himself constantly that all that glitters is not gold.

THE MUSLIM MASS CONTACT CAMPAIGN

It is an illustration of international interdependence that the latest scenes in Indian politics have been played against a background of ideas and movements from far and near. In their light it is easy to follow the course of affairs since the assumption of office by the Congress in half a dozen provinces in July 1937. It had won the elections, *inter alia*, on the basis

of an economic programme conceived in the interests of the peasants and the labourers and tinged with egalitarianism which was expected by some of the leaders, though not by Mahatma Gandhi, to blossom into socialism. There was the prospect of a Congress government in the federation, for the federal scheme of the Government of India Act, 1935, though attacked from various quarters, was generally expected to materialise in the near future. Lest the basis of the Congress government should be unduly narrow, it was proposed to launch a mass contact programme and win over the Muslim masses on the basis of political independence and economic improvement. The Muslim League as a party was faced with the prospect of long exclusion from power not only in several provinces but also in the coming Federation. The rigid discipline enforced by the High Command forbade all hope of the Congress splitting into parties and a coalition being formed. What was equally momentous, the Congress proposed to cut the ground beneath the League by winning over the Muslim masses to itself. True, the Congress promised economic prosperity, but man does not live by bread alone.

FEAR OF THE FUTURE

It was the fear of the future that weighed heavily on the Muslim mind in 1937. Its misgivings were roused afresh by the incorporation of certain party symbols into the practice of Congress legislatures and executives. The Congress majorities insisted not merely on hoisting the Congress flag on certain buildings but also on the singing of the intensely Sanskritised Bandemataram song to inaugurate the legislative sessions. Soon afterwards the Congress Government of the Central Provinces persisted in a designation, Vidyamandir, not only Sanskritised but meaning 'temple of learning'—the term temple being particularly obnoxious to opponents of idolatry—for a certain type of school in the teeth of keen opposition from the Muslims.

and yielded at last only a campaign of passive resistance. The Muslims resented the increasing abandonment of Urdu by the Hindus and were set a-thinking by the warm advocacy of the cause of Hindi, as distinct from Urdu, by some prominent leaders in the U.P., the C.P. and Bihar. Many a Muslim looked askance at Congressmen's utterances in Sanskritised Hindi before composite audiences. The Muslim League felt that the majority paid little heed to the accommodation of minorities. Its own growing coolness of patriotism and its increasing inability to transcend the limitations of the communal standpoint disposed it to interpret any ambiguous move as an attempt to suppress Muslim culture and establish a Hindu Raj. Disregard of one's susceptibilities and denial of a due share of influence and power weaken the sense of identification with an association or a commonwealth and result either in uneasy acquiescence or a struggle to get round the majority, in the last resort through secession or disruption. Whatever rouses a humiliating sense of existence on sufferance paves the way either for perpetual disharmony or for active revolt.

THE MUSLIM LEAGUE AS "OFFICIAL" OPPOSITION

An ominous stage had been reached when the course of affairs led the Muslim League in 1937 to function as official opposition in six provincial legislatures and sternly to repudiate the Muslim ministers in the Congress cabinets. Party is an indispensable instrument of parliamentary government and secures those alternations in office which constitute the basic difference between democratic and dictatorial governments. It organises discussion as a way of government, but as a political device it breaks down in face of fundamental issues like race and religion which rouse all the passions of the human heart. When parties are formed on the religious or racial basis, the ground is prepared for widespread disturbance—riots, secession or civil war.

THE MUSLIM LEAGUE ON ITS METTLE

The establishment of exclusively Congress governments on the support of predominantly Hindu majorities, the grim prospect of powerlessness in the coming Federation and the Congress plan of contact with the Muslim masses roused something like consternation in Muslim political circles in 1937. The League was put on its mettle and accepted what seemed to it an insolent challenge born of intoxication of power. A few by-elections in the United Provinces and elsewhere soon demonstrated that the Muslim Mass Contact programme was still-born. The fact that the oppressions and atrocities charged against Congress Governments had never occurred and that the designs attributed to the Congress cabinets of suppressing Muslim culture had never crossed any imagination served only to reveal the depth of resentment. The Muslim League sought to organise the Musalmans solidly under one banner, claimed to be their sole representative and, as a logical corollary, equated the National Congress with a Hindu organisation. It demanded a veto on constitutional advance and, pending a satisfactory settlement, sought to immobilise the national movement.

THE SITUATION IN 1940

It is not difficult to understand why the two years and a half of Congress Government were, in spite of some solid achievements, marked by communal tension. Nor did matters improve when the war broke out in Europe in September 1939 and entailed the resignation of the Congress Governments in the following November. The British Government naturally desired to steer as clear of controversy as possible and direct all attention and energy to the war, but its declarations, specially that of August 8th, 1940, making political advance contingent on prior agreement among the various parties, served to intensify the elements of bargaining and power politics in the

Indian situation. Ever since 1927 the political scene had echoed and re-echoed to safeguards, special responsibilities, privileges, reservations, quotas and weightages. Politics had long been kept in a seethe and the atmosphere was full of bluff and threat. Some of the statements on behalf of the princes on Federation had seemed to violate not only the first principles of all federalism but also the first principles of all government. Thirteen unlucky years of procrastination, hesitation, bargaining and intransigence had brought Indian politics to a pass in which appeal to fairness was becoming rarer and rarer. It is by no means surprising that in this din of the market-place the Muslim League resolved to raise its voice to a high pitch and make sure of being heard. But in the thick fog of claims and counter-claims it struck into a blind alley—partition or Pakistan.

PARTITION

The idea of an Islamic state in the North-West had floated in an amorphous form in a few minds in the general ferment of 1919 and was espoused by Sir Mohammad Iqbal, the poet of Pan-Islamism, in 1931. Presiding over the All-India Muslim League at Allahabad in 1931 he advocated the consolidation of the north-western provinces into a single administration. But he never went so far as to urge sovereign independence for it. The latter idea was worked out in a few pamphlets in the heat of communal tension and figured on the programme of the Muslim League in March 1940. But at this time the notion of complete Partition was not taken seriously anywhere outside the League, and the British Government seems to have thought that Moslem fears would be assuaged by its declaration on the 8th of August that power would not be transferred 'to any system of government whose authority is directly denied by large and powerful elements in India's national life. Nor could they be parties to the coercion of such elements into submission to such a government.' But when Sir Stafford Cripps submitted the British War Cabinet's proposals to the Indian leaders on

March 30th, 1942, Pakistan had become a live issue. The proposals left to the provinces, the option of accession to the contemplated Indian Union, and they expressed the readiness of His Majesty's Government to assign to such non-acceding provinces "the same full status as the Indian Union." At last, in July 1944, Mr C. Rajagopalachariar published a formula which had been approved by Mahatma Gandhi and which seemed to concede the principle of partition, though in a form and with qualifications which had not been contemplated by the Muslim League. It envisaged after the war a commission for demarcating contiguous districts in the north-west and in the east with an absolute majority of Muslims for a plebiscite of all the inhabitants on the issue of separation from Hindustan. In the event of separation, the formula contemplated mutual agreements for safeguarding defence, commerce and communication and for other essential purposes. Conversations and correspondence between Mahatma Gandhi and Mr Jinnah, from the 9th to the 26th of September 1944, revealed profound differences. No agreement was possible, but the idea remained one of the dominants of Indian politics.

CONTRADICTIONS OF PAKISTAN

The extreme logic of separate electorates seemed indeed to point to complete separation, but every one quails before the implied exchange of populations. That involves, as post-war Balkan experiments showed, a degree of psychological and economic uprooting and suffering that beggars description. It is natural that even the plan of partition should hesitate before these horrors and before the impracticability of another implication, absolute restriction of all migration on the score of religion to and fro in future, but the hesitation introduces inner contradictions into it. Pakistan offers the charm of taking a majority, that is, fifty-five millions of Muslims, beyond Hindustan, but it would leave about twenty-four millions of

them as minorities in the various provinces of Hindustan. At the same time, it would include more than thirty-four millions of Hindus, nearly four millions of Sikhs, and more than three millions of others as minorities. It is obvious that it does not contain a solution of the problem of minorities either for Hindustan or for Pakistan or for any of the provinces or states. The Punjab and Bengal alike comprise predominantly Hindu or Sikh, just like predominantly Muslim, districts. The plan does not repudiate separate electorates : indeed, it seems to accept all their disadvantages. If India were split into two, four or even twenty fragments and separate electorates retained, each state would soon be writhing in civil strife and the resulting bickerings would involve any two of them in ceaseless war. Nothing can be so destructive of peace and goodwill as the idea of treating minorities in one province as hostages for the fair treatment of one's co-religionists in another province. Vicarious punishment entails a clean shift of the basis of politics from civilisation to barbarism. There is yet another contradiction in the scheme of partition owing to its perfectly natural, though illogical, refusal to accept exchange of populations. There is something naïve in envisaging that very goodwill and co-operation in matters of defence with Hindustan whose absence is adduced as an argument for separation.

UNITY OF INDIA

It is an index of the really sharp difficulties confronting the Musalmans that a considerable section of them should urge a solution which is ruled out by the facts of nature as well as of history and psychology. There is no country marked out by the sea and the mountains so clearly to be a single whole as India. This geographical wholeness explains one of the central features of Indian history, the urge to political unification, in defiance of vast distances and immense difficulties of transport and communication. The ideal of a state extending from sea to

sea appeared as early as the Vedic Age. Practically the whole country was brought under one sovereignty by the Mauryan emperors during the third and second centuries B.C., by the Gupta emperors in the fourth and fifth centuries A.D., by the Khilji and Tughlak Sultans in the fourteenth century and by the Mughal emperors in the seventeenth century. On the crest of the centripetal waves, the Maratha Confederacy rose to the hegemony of the greater part of India in the eighteenth century. No empire could last for many centuries in India or elsewhere prior to the application of science to transport. But the centripetal forces, already buttressed by cultural homogeneity, were irrepressible. All history tends to show that there is room in India for only one political system, especially after the mechanical revolution. The country admits of adequate railway and telegraphic arrangements and of economic planning only as a single unit. The mineral resources and the raw materials are so distributed that no part of the country can progress independently of the rest. Sind and the N.-W.F.P. are still deficit provinces receiving subventions from the Central Government. Their resources together with those of the Punjab and Bengal, that is to say, the present revenues of them all, together with their share, as independent entities, of the present central revenues would scarcely suffice for expansion of nation-building activities, much less for the very costly defence of the North-West Frontier, not to speak of the necessity that would arise of fortifying on both sides naturally indefensible frontiers between the North-West or Bengal and the neighbouring provinces. The share of the Indian public debt which would fall to them would in itself constitute a heavy burden. The terrible famine which accounted for about 50,000 deaths a week for months together in 1943 in Bengal and which was alleviated only by import of grains from other provinces demonstrated the economic unity of the country and the need of a central or federal government strong enough to enforce co-operation among the provinces.

THE STRATEGIC POSITION

The strategic position makes a single Government of India not a choice but an absolute compulsion. The present war has demonstrated the defencelessness of small and medium-sized states and may be expected to inaugurate an era of big states or federations. The small state has become an anachronism because war is now an affair of colossal ammunition and mechanisation, colossal finance and colossal armies. It is being fought to-day not so much by countries as by empires and continents. It may spread to any quarter of the globe, while its eventual termination may, on account of the deep hold of colonialism on the European and Japanese minds, be followed by fresh and deadlier conflicts. The drama of international affairs has travelled eastwards to find grimmer plots. From the Indian standpoint it is difficult to exaggerate the significance of the transfer of the centre of gravity from the Atlantic to the Pacific, whose waves touch the shores of great states with big populations or resources—the United States, Canada, Japan, China, Russia, Australia and India. Here the immediate or the remote future may witness titanic struggles calculated to decide the fortunes of the human race. With world wars raging at her gates, India must defend herself increasingly with her own arms and her own resources. She must have a government capable of mobilising all the power of brain and muscle that there is in the country and realise all the possibilities of industrial development. A completely independent state in the North-West or in Bengal would be incapable of defence against powerful invasion and render the rest of India equally defenceless. There is a lesson to be learnt for the future in the Japanese conquest of the East Indies, Burma and the Andamans in 1942, and the consequent mobilisation of the entire resources of India to dislodge the invaders. On the other hand, permanent, as distinct from merely war-time, collaboration between the two or more entities would imply a degree of joint control over army, navy and air

force, transport and communication, finance, customs, taxation and economic enterprise in general enough to reintroduce a common government. To admit this joint control is, of course, to negate the idea of partition. A single government for India is rooted in the necessity of ultimate effective adjustment. To speak of the Hindus and Musalmans as belonging to different civilisations is to equate the whole of civilisation with the religious creed and, for the rest, to magnify non-essentials to the utter neglect of the unifying effects of a common climate and economy, culture and interests.

NATIONHOOD AND STATEHOOD.

To call the Hindus or the Musalmans a separate nation is to use the term in the unusual sense of a religious group and invite confusion from its political associations, but in any case it does not follow that nationhood coincides with statehood. The confusion between the two has been one of the chief sources of disquiet and frustration during the last hundred and fifty years in Europe. The dissociation of Statehood from Nationhood is one of the supreme needs of the modern age in the East as well as the West; in a word, depoliticisation of the whole concept of nationality, a definite renunciation of the idea that those who feel themselves to be a nation should necessarily constitute an independent state of their own.

SOURCES OF RESISTANCE TO PARTITION

A partition of India, even with goodwill on all sides, would be economically ruinous and strategically disastrous to all. Political institutions and arrangements do not obey the motives of their authors. They have a logic of their own which unfolds itself by way of response to the totality of a dynamic environment. As a matter of fact, the idea of partition has already evoked opposition in many quarters. To some Musalmans in the Deccan and the South it threatens a deterioration in their position.

while to some in the North it seems a superfluity in the face of provincial autonomy in the Punjab, Sind, the N.-W.F.P. and Bengal. It is not likely to find favour with the industrial, commercial and banking interests whose operations extend over the whole country and to whom possible tariff walls would be a grave impediment. Small minorities may not like to be cut up under several flags. The slogan "no swaraj without Pakistan" underrates the intelligence of non-Muslims and overrates their ardour for independence. It seems that separate electorates which kept Congressmen in the dark about Muslim thought in 1937 have also prevented the Muslim League from gauging the strength of the patriotic sentiment, centring on national unity, in the country as a whole. It is difficult to contemplate with equanimity the resistance which the Sikhs, besides the Hindus and others, may offer to partition. Another complication is the presence of states ruled by Hindu princes on the borders of Sind and the Punjab and even Bengal.

BRITISH ATTITUDE TOWARDS PARTITION

Nor is the idea likely to find support ultimately with the British Government. Foreign policies are proverbially unstable; the small states have lost their old sanctity; violations of neutrality since April 1940 have not called forth a fraction of the opprobrium which the invasion of Belgium excited in August 1914. Confederations of many neighbouring states now seem inevitable; the British Government offered a union on the basis of common citizenship to France on the eve of the collapse in June 1940; an Anglo-American union has entered the zone of practical politics. In this context of world conditions none can gauge the chances of *rapprochement* or hostility between a comparatively small Pakistan and the neighbouring lands. It may have to fight wars which Afghanistan or Russia may hesitate to wage against the much vaster man-power and resources of India in its entirety. Or, it may be tempted to enter into some

sort of understanding with neighbours on the North-West. Either contingency will, so long as any British connection or alliance remains, either on the Dominion or separate treaty basis, confront British diplomacy with serious entanglements. For more than a hundred years Britain has been extremely sensitive about the North-Western approaches to India.

Partition of India is clearly out of accord with British interests in Asia. It may, however, be retorted that during the last decade British cabinets failed to assess international trends and actually followed policies calculated to injure the interests of the Empire—the weakening of the system of collective security by countenancing Japanese aggression in Manchuria in 1931, the connivance at the destruction of the Spanish Republic in 1936-38, the alienation of Russia and the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia at the altar of German appeasement in 1938. British cabinets are likely to be more circumspect in future, but a bare possibility may theoretically be admitted that overwhelming force can partition India as any other country for a while. But only for a while. It is not given to man to pull a geographical, cultural and economical whole to pieces and to rearrange the parts at will with any durable prospects. The tempo of separation would have its own repercussions on the Indian states; it would disintegrate Pakistan itself. The throwback to the eighteenth or eleventh century would soon bring a reaction and give the age-long centripetal forces a chance again. Partition will not stay put. Out of it may emerge something that nobody wants. A confederation of India as a whole with the United Nations or with the Middle East or with the whole world may some day become a practical proposition. But an enduring partition of India is not less difficult than a redistribution of the Himalayan ranges, the abolition of history, the destruction of patriotism, or the obliteration of the genius of the modern age. Even as a stop-gap, it points logically to perpetual antagonism, requiring the perpetual presence of an overwhelming British force and, therefore, British control of foreign policy, of economic life,

in fact, of all the major departments of government. Partition is a circle of stagnation. The idea was forced into prominence by thirteen years of stagnation. If realised, it would spell stagnation. Yet stagnation is the one thing that civilisation cannot bear for long. The dynamic quality of civilisation asserts itself and movement commences again.

THE MORAL OF THE IDEA

Partition offers no solution of the Indian problem. Paradoxical as it may seem, it is a psychological escape from the stern realities of the situation. It is a gesture of a century of revivalism, a generation of separate electorates, half a generation of procrastination, a decade of misleading or misunderstood foreign influences, and two and a half years of orthodox parliamentarism. It is a milestone on the separatist road to security. It is a confession of the failure of separate electorate as tried so far. In the logical sequence, it is only a half-way house; if persisted in, it cannot escape the corollaries of exchange of populations and finally a drive towards the complete domination either of the Hindus by the Musalmans or of the Musalmans by the Hindus. That is an utter impossibility and the end of the blind alley. These implications are not mere abstractions; they inhere in the idea and could be overlooked only in the abnormal mists of the Indian situation. As the sky clears and the realities are perceived, the good sense of both the communities as well as the pressure of events is likely to give a new direction to politics. But so long as the idea endures, whether as a bargaining counter or a serious proposition, the danger of it is in the estrangement that it may create. Every political idea evokes an appropriate technique of propaganda and often a corresponding mutation in a whole programme. The idea of separation propagates itself naturally by seizing on existing differences and magnifying them into fundamentals. It grates on the patriotic sentiments of millions and drives the

iron into the soul. All this weakens the will to agreement. That indeed is the most alarming difference between the present situation and that in 1916 or even in 1930. There is another risk in using separationist pleas as political feelers or levers. They may inflame the imagination of an extensive and immature public and make retreat awkward. The leaders may then find it difficult to shake off chains of their own making. That the idea of Pakistan should have been adopted by a great political organisation cannot but disturb the complacency of the others. To the Hindus it is an excruciating warning to turn the search-light inwards and eradicate those attitudes which prevent others from feeling completely secure with them. It is also a symptom of political immaturity that partition should ever have entered the zone of practical politics. It is up to the intelligentsia to inculcate a deeper and wider sense of political obligation. The emergence of partition as one of the central issues in Indian politics also constitutes a severe indictment of the British Government for its sphinx-like silence and its fondness for communal balance as a means of stabilising the *status quo*. It is a call to the British Government to adopt a more enlightened policy, try to assume a moral leadership and cast its immense weight on the side of political advance. Above all, it imposes an obligation to find such a comprehensive remedy for the distempers of the body-politic as may bring a sense of peace and freedom to all.

PART TWO—SUGGESTIONS

CHAPTER IV

MARCH FORWARD

THREE CATEGORIES OF HINDU-MUSLIM QUESTIONS

CIVILISATION is essentially dynamic, but a smooth movement of its wheels depends on a careful balancing of the burdens and on the removal of obstacles from the path. It is a complex of ideas, values, sentiments, traditions, institutions and instruments. Whenever they fail to move together in harmony, whenever there is an undue tilting of the balance in any direction, or a hiatus in the way of progress as such, the energies turn on themselves and dislocate the working of the social organism. Civil dissensions are at bottom a reflection of frustrations and balked dispositions. The problems to which they have given rise in India fall into three categories: problems of attitude which admit of being outgrown rather than settled in the ordinary sense of the term; problems of culture which admit partly of being outgrown and partly of immediate adjustment; and lastly, problems of politics which lend themselves pre-eminently to compromise. Thus there is a three-fold solution: a long-range solution|pertaining to general progress, an immediate settlement pertaining to political issues and an intermediate integration pertaining to cultural matters. The organic whole-ness of life, of course, requires that all the problems be tackled forthwith and that the solution should, *inter alia*, take the form of a vast movement towards harmony in every aspect of life. Every human problem is an incident in a certain environment and alters its character in accordance with the positive and subjective changes which come over that environment. For

instance, the Catholics and the Protestants who fought in France and plotted against each other in Britain, not to speak of other European countries, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries settled down to tolerance and concord with a change in the intellectual atmosphere and economic life in the eighteenth century. The dissensions were not "settled"; they were outgrown; the corresponding attitudes were metamorphosed; the frustrations were got rid of. It is, indeed, a characteristic of inferior or needless problems that they are not solved; they are eliminated, they are passed by, in any march forward. No government can legislate men into charity and goodwill, but official and non-official agencies alike can co-operate to remove ignorance, disease, poverty, privileges and disabilities on the basis of birth, which predispose the mind to pettiness and jealousy, narrow the horizon and foster strife. They can co-operate to universalise enlightenment, economic well-being and equality of opportunity which open out new vistas of intellectual and spiritual endeavour and are conducive to breadth of vision and social harmony. Progress in the wider sense drives away many social differences, just as an improvement in general health drives away many ailments.

SOCIAL JUSTICE

Peace and happiness depend on a dynamic social justice, in other words, on equalisation and maximisation of opportunity. If opportunity is unequal, social life is disturbed by jealousies, frictions, dominations and suppressions. If opportunity is meagre, it keeps society at a low level and promotes unhealthy scramble and constant wrangling. The master principle of social organisation is to equalise opportunity of self-expression for all and to maximise it to the farthest reach of the resources available at a given moment. Maximisation of opportunity is maximisation of being. The prime intellectual requisite in India, as everywhere else to-day, is a realisation that science

has rendered it possible, now for the first time in history, to universalise enlightenment and comfort, to raise humanity clean above want and to convert the erstwhile economy of pain and toil into one of leisure and well-being. The more vivid the realisation of this new factor, the greater would be the turn away from war and strife to amity and co-operation in the world. It is, of course, equally necessary to understand that the universal well-being which has entered the zone of possibility depends for its actualisation on a correspondingly great effort of organisation and moral idealism. It is in proportion to this effort that a modern society can be regarded as approximating to the ideal of social justice.

SELF-REALISATION

Social life may be said to rise to higher planes in proportion as the personality of every single individual—man, woman and child—obtains a fair chance of unfolding its capacities and possibilities. Personality grows and fulfils itself not in isolation but through social relationships. In other words, personal growth is synonymous with growth in interdependence, entails intimate co-operation and fosters that organisation which is favourable to co-operation. It is made of the same stuff as social amity. It implies, in short, a rise in efficiency and mutual aid on an ever-growing scale which shakes off petty jealousies and cognate irrelevancies. On the other hand, if the possibilities of a higher life are left unnoticed or unrealised, there supervenes a dual mood of acquiescence in a low level of life and of struggle for the little that there is. India suffers to-day, like every other country in a greater or lesser measure, from this complex of acquiescence and aimless debate. The moral solution—which is the ultimate solution of social problems—consists in march forward towards the ideal of social justice, a practical recognition of the Kantian dictum that every man is an end unto himself.

UNIVERSAL EDUCATION

The first and by far the most important item in social justice, that is to say, in the equalisation and maximisation of opportunity, is universal education. Under modern conditions education is not a luxury for the few but a necessity for all, the condition precedent to all stable advance—industrialisation, genuine citizenship and well-being. Ignorance tends to perpetuate old prejudices, exposes the public to designing agitation, lowers the standards of leadership and blocks the pathways of reform. It imprisons the mind in narrow cages and makes it difficult to take a lofty view of public affairs. India's three hundred and fifty-nine millions (according to the 1941 census) constitute about one-fifth of the world's population and include about one-third of the world's illiterates. Literacy increased from less than 4 per cent. in 1841 to 6 per cent. in 1911, to about 8 per cent. in 1921, and to about 8.5 per cent. in 1931. It is still less than 10 per cent. It works out to progress at the rate of less than 1 per cent. per decade, so that less than 10 per cent. of the population are literate to-day. Universal literacy would at this rate be reached only in six or seven hundred years. Here is the tragedy in a nutshell: the tendency to spread over more than twenty generations what can be accomplished under modern conditions in less than one generation. A system of government which entails this anachronism, calls for early revision into conformity with modern requirements. Whatever government be in power, it is the first task of public opinion to hold it true to the ideal of the educational state. A little reflection on that interrelation of minds which we call society will show that education produces its best result not when it trickles down in small doses but when it is rapidly universalized. In India education has progressed so gradually as to expose the educated few to conquest afresh by the ignorant mass and to leave the reserves of crude prejudice practically untouched. There is yet another risk in the slow progress of education:

the grave inequality in the distribution of education, that is, of ability, may produce a narrow oligarchy. Now that science has placed enormous means of wealth at the disposal of the community, there must be something radically deficient in will or intelligence with a government which fails to educate every child and to provide for continued and adult education. Nothing else can actualise the potential gains of civilisation.

IMPROVEMENT IN EDUCATION

The advance of civilisation widens the distance between the child and the social heritage. It is for the school to orientate the pupil towards the accumulated culture and large-scale organisation of modern society. Education has not merely to be universalised but also to be improved. It is disquieting to reflect that in many cases education leaves but a faint impression on habits of thought and fails to withstand the impact of inherited dogma or propaganda. Here in India it is necessary to carry much further the movement to psychological education. One of the urgent needs of Indian schooling is enrichment by the trial of new methods like the Dalton Plan, the Project Method and the Howard Plan. As a result, the school will equip the pupils with a far greater amount of knowledge, manual dexterity and all-round training. Scientific methods of education, handled by teachers who are trained psychologists and who command wide realms of knowledge, can turn out youths far better equipped for the university or technical institute and for life than we realise to-day. They should serve to liberate the mind, foster a sense of proportion and inculcate a more correct perspective for the communal and other problems. Civilisation can be sustained on a high level only if the school and the university can effectively transmit, refine and advance the social heritage.

WORLD-ORIENTATION

There is a certain environment which education inevitably takes for its context and to which it tends to orientate the pupil. Indian education stands in need of integration with the cultural *milieu* and aspirations of the people. But this is not a bar to the attainment of a wider harmony. A major reform of which mankind stands in need is that education be orientated not to a parochial environment which accorded with the small-scale organisation of the past but to the world environment into which the scientific revolution has thrown us all. It will obviate the cramping effect of caste, sect, revivalism, and provincialism and bring the minds to common scientific and humanitarian planes. Facts of geography, economics or civics have to be explained against as wide a background as the pupil's understanding permits. It is specially necessary to teach history in the world perspective not only to maximise its educational and practical value but also to remove many ill-balanced notions about the relations of the communities in the past in India. A study of world history, for instance, would place any oppressions and persecutions of medieval India in the correct perspective and bring out the general reign of *laissez-faire* and tolerance. It would conduce to a deeper insight into political processes and propaganda, so that the slogans of religion in Indian wars, for instance, in the eleventh and twelfth centuries and in Timur's invasion in 1398, would be seen to possess only as much significance as slogans of *kultur*, co-prosperity, new order or self-determination in modern wars. They were appeals to rouse enthusiasm and mobilise support; they were not complete descriptions of causes and motives.

EMPHASIS ON THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Civilisation is not only a moral but also an intellectual venture, so that education must always remain one of the most

efficient instruments of adjustment to its complexities and interactions. It must accordingly put greater emphasis on the social sciences. From the personal standpoint, a grounding in the social sciences would go a long way to save the mind and the will from being paralysed by psychologised propaganda or mass emotion of the crowd. It will thus remove, at least in part, one of the major difficulties in the Indian situation and assist to straighten out intergroup entanglements. It will also equip the Indian youth with knowledge, judgment and balance enough to assess foreign influences. India can afford no longer to accept ideas that swim into her ken from Europe or the Middle East at their face value. One is reminded with special force to-day of a repeated saying of Professor Graham Wallas, one of the greatest of political philosophers during the last generation, that India must do her own thinking. The dictum is not a counsel of intellectual isolation or of revivalism; much less does it imply that we can turn our back on the solid achievements of modern science and philosophy. What it does mean is that the salvation of India does not lie in imitation of western fashions and that we must arm ourselves with a critical apparatus and solve our problems in the content of our own environment. The starting-point is a rigorous training in the social sciences—anthropology, sociology, economics, politics, social psychology and jurisprudence. The next step, or rather an essential supplement, is a comparative study of religions, literatures, arts and other branches of culture, on the part of the largest possible number of students and adults at every Indian university. To familiarise members of every denomination with the tenets and ideals of the others will be a great contribution to mutual understanding. The joint pursuit of traditional cultures and the modern social sciences may make Indian seminaries homes not only of catholic learning but also of vital movements in thought. It will exert a liberalising influence on religion, politics and every other department of life. It will serve to deepen the sense of citizenship.

SOCIAL REFORM

While educational expansion and reform are the most important items in any programme of social justice, it is difficult to exaggerate the role of organised endeavour for social reform. During the last two generations the position of woman has improved in India. A movement for the uplift of the depressed classes has gained ground. Caste has lost some of its hold : its more rapid passing may effect a great improvement in group relations all round. Caste engenders the mentality of hierarchy, of inequality and of appointed stations. It makes various groups of Hindus feel uneasy among themselves ; it projects itself into intercommunal relations and awakens grave misgivings in the minds of minorities.

CASTE AND DISCOMMUNITY

The breakdown of the old economy has, on the whole, been accompanied by relaxation of caste, which may be reckoned one of the healthiest symptoms in the body politic, but the transition has temporarily accentuated its heterogeneous influence in some respects. Caste rested partly on the basis of the local habitat and the difficulty of communication. When a group did migrate to another region in former times it lost touch with the old surroundings, adjusted itself thoroughly to the new environment and adopted the language, etiquette, manners and customs of the people among whom it had settled down. It was now either an ordinary sub-caste by itself or sometimes it helped itself through some fiction into fusion with one or more sub-castes around. The modern facilities of transport and communication have multiplied migration for purpose of trade, industry and government or private service, but they have also enabled the emigrants to keep in touch with their own homeland, so that they have persisted in their own language and manner, much to their economic disadvantage. Long after they have

been domiciled in another province, they have tended to herd together and form clubs of their own. They cannot enter into the soul of those in whose midst they pass their lives. Sectionalism habituates the mind to heterogeneity and indirectly influences all group relations. Lately, social fusion has commenced on the basis of intersub-caste marriages, but the period of transition is not yet over, so that every province contains minorities—domiciled citizens prevented only by the institution of caste from complete fusion and community with another province. The stress of unemployment naturally embitters their relations with the majorities and gives rise to a form of discommunity.

ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENT

Fourthly, it is necessary to release the people from the benumbing fetters of the poverty which has made the Indian ryot a by-word for a low standard of life in the social sciences and which spells denial of opportunity to the vast majority of the population. It has lately been calculated that the annual income *per capita* in British India in the year 1942-43 amounted to Rs. 114, which is equivalent to about Rs. 69 in terms of pre-war prices. In terms of purchasing power, it is several times lower than the income *per capita* in Western and Central Europe, the U.S.A. and the British Dominions. Under modern conditions poverty and illiteracy are bound up together: they must stand or be liquidated together. Economic improvement and enlightenment are complementary aspects of the same programme of mass uplift.

AGRICULTURE

A systematic application of science to agriculture has long been overdue. At present Indian agriculture is very rudimentary and individualistic. Mechanisation may open the way to co-operation in many respects and tend to replace the individualistic by the co-operative mentality. It will not only make agriculture

several times more profitable, but may also exercise a decisive influence on habits and attitudes and therefore on group relationships.

INDUSTRY

A similar psychological influence may be expected from industrial expansion. Industry has made considerable progress during the last thirty years; the recent move to establish new heavy industries is full of promise, but a vast leeway has yet to be made up. Industry engages less than 20 millions and transport and communications less than 3 millions in India. Natural resources are still exploited very imperfectly. The present war has been responsible for an increase of more than 35 per cent. on the average in certain industries in India. Yet, the output of cotton piece-goods in 1943-44 amounted only to 4,842 million yards, of factory-made sugar only to 2.22 million tons, and of paper to 1.44 million tons. The present output of finished steel is estimated to amount to no higher figure than $1\frac{1}{2}$ million tons, that is, less than 1 per cent. of the total world output. The National Planning Committee set up by the Congress during its brief tenure of provincial administration was a happy augury, promising to break the ground for large-scale industrialisation. A warm welcome greeted the Bombay Plan formulated in 1944 by a few of the leading industrialists in India for the establishment of new heavy as well as light industries designed to raise the standard of life. Success, however, depends, among other factors, on the support of Britain and the readiness on the part of her financial and economic interests to rise above colonialism and realise that a highly prosperous India would prove a source of commercial gain to them. Modern scientific technique is really making mercantilism—the subordination of the economic interests of one country to those of another—as obsolete as slavery or serfdom. It is an illustration of the frequent lag between actualities or possibilities and traditions that financial and economic groups in Europe, as in Japan, are still enveloped

in notions of monopolising trade, annexing territory, and thus creating international jealousy, armament and warfare. So far as Britain and India are concerned, the happenings of the last few years alone have amply demonstrated that a poor, illiterate and defenceless India, far from being an asset, may become a grave liability to British interests. It is time that a thorough-going plan of industrialisation be put into effect in India.

COMMON FIELDS OF ACTIVITY

Industrial expansion needs to be accompanied by a high socio-economic code guaranteeing a minimum wage, wholesome conditions of work, something like an eight-hour day and insurance against accident, sickness, unemployment and old age. But in any case, it is likely to generate an immense working-class movement, cutting across caste and sect and bringing Hindus, Musalmans and others into common functional associations in furtherance of common objectives and struggles. It need scarcely be pointed out that trade unions on denominational lines would be worse than useless; they would enable the employers to play the one against the other and cut down the wages of all. Along with national trade unions would arise non-communal organisations of employers and those of technicians and managers. They, too, would serve to correct the undue emphasis possible under the present simpler economy on religious cleavage. There are immense potentialities of economic improvement as well as of communal harmony in the co-operatives of cultivators for tillage, purchase of seeds, manure, etc., and marketing; of consumers for the supply of various commodities; and of industrialists for various purposes. In 1938, the total number of co-operative societies in British India was less than a hundred thousand and the total membership less than four and a half millions. Economic reorganisation would forthwith multiply the totals and show that the most effective solvent of suspicion and mistrust is comradeship in creative labour.

CLEARANCE OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS

A release from poverty and a many-sided economic life will also imply a release from many local squabbles and misunderstandings which swell the tide of communal feeling. Opportunities of safe industrial investment, for instance, will make the Punjab Hindus as friendly to the Land Alienation Act as the Muslims. Agrarian improvement, including a reform in land tenure, will do away with the antagonism, noticeable for more than a generation, between the Hindu landlords and Muslim cultivators in Bengal. General economic improvement, together with co-operative credit, will make it unnecessary for Muslims to borrow at high rates of interest from Hindu money-lenders or *vice versa*.

A FRESH STRATIFICATION AND OUTLOOK

The rise of new industrial and commercial vocations and the reorganisation of old ones on the basis of applied science and affluence are likely to alter the social stratification in a profound manner. They may be expected to depress the importance of the feudal arrangements which have lost their old capacity of cementing the Hindu and Muslim elements in the rural life of the country. They may usher into being a very strong and numerous middle class, free from the spectre of unemployment which sharpens internal cleavages. Above all, it may be repeated that big industry calls forth a large working class. The latter may start with prosperity, if the economic transition is guided in accordance with the lessons which the world has learnt painfully during the last hundred and fifty years. Otherwise, it may organise itself and fight its way to comfortable and equitable conditions. In either case, it is highly probable that such a working class will look to the future rather than to the past, and be class-conscious rather than sect-conscious. It will escape or transcend the cruder influences of revivalism and the

more amenable to a synthetic approach. If large-scale economic changes be effected in the wake of universal education, every social question will insensibly change its colour and many antagonisms will simply fade away. Hindu-Muslim problems that strike some to-day as insoluble will be clean outgrown, and posterity may require an effort of the imagination to understand their historical genesis and to recapture the atmosphere to which they are congenial. Large-scale changes in organisation and attitude take time to consummate themselves. But a conscious and planned beginning exercises a wholesome effect on the temper and introduces a flood of light into a thick gloom. As the mind grows into passion for higher life, it breaks down the narrow confines; sectarian differences are watered down to modernity and harmony.

DEFENCE

With the modernisation of economic life is bound up the question of national defence. The present war is bringing home the necessity of improvising adequate defence for India on the basis of her own resources. For more than a century the British Navy afforded a marvellous degree of security to India, but its supremacy is now challenged by other navies both in the Atlantic and in the Pacific and, what is more serious, by the submarine and the aeroplane. A revolution of permanent significance has occurred in offensive and defensive warfare on land and sea alike and imposes on India the task of fitting an army, a navy and an air force capable of coping with the mightiest power on earth. If the peril arising from the possibility of yet more terrible wars in future in the Middle East as well as in the Far East were adequately realised in India, the controversies about percentages and partitions may fade away before a vast programme of armament and its conditions precedent, industrialisation and universal education. Communal differences are a luxury of guaranteed security and may be blotted out by a real

sense of dangers from without. One of the greatest psychological needs of the Indian situation is a realisation that the erstwhile sense of security is obsolete.

RELIEF OF EDUCATED UNEMPLOYMENT

Educational expansion, industrialisation, the consequent extension of transport, communication, commerce and banking and comprehensive defence, would absorb the talents of all educated men and terminate one of the chronic phases of Indian unemployment. It will remove one of the important causes of communal disharmony. It would extinguish all heart-burning about quotas of posts for the different communities.

MODERNISATION AND SECULARITY

The progress, quantitative and qualitative, of education, industry and defence would go a long way towards modernising the country and correcting the narrowness incidental to revivalism. The alliance between pure science and production and transport is calculated to enlarge the class that is engaged in the disinterested pursuit of truth. The more numerous the common activities of reconstruction, the larger would be the sphere of secularity. It may be pointed out that secularity implies no encroachment on the sphere proper to religion. It only means the desirability of freeing worldly activities from the sectarian tinge in a country which follows more than one religion. It would enable Indian nationalism to get round the sectional differences and would open the way to social reorganisation on principles of liberty and equality of opportunity.

INTERCONNECTION OF EDUCATION, INDUSTRY AND DEFENCE

Modern conditions have established an interdependence between progress in enlightenment, industry and self-defence. Illiteracy is a handicap not merely in skilled labour but also in

the manipulation of mechanised instruments of war. Education stimulates new wants and that craving for a high standard of living which is the surest incentive to exertion and industrial expansion. Technical education, implying an enormous advance and diffusion of scientific knowledge, is indispensable to the operation of industry and organisation of defence. Both defence and mass education are very costly and can be sustained only out of the proceeds of large-scale industry. It need scarcely be pointed out that education and industry alike depend for security on efficacy of defence. Here, too, the organic wholeness, that is, the interdependence of associated life, prescribes a concerted and simultaneous effort to spread education, industrialise the country and organise defence. The initial financial difficulty is certainly serious, but it is possible to surmount it through big loans guaranteed by the state and through a plan of the state purchasing a certain percentage of the shares and filling a percentage of seats on the directorates of industrial and banking concerns so as to assure and attract private investment. In addition to this social control, it should also be possible to start on plans of socialisation in regard to basic industries or plants.

THE TEMPO OF RECONSTRUCTION

Alterations in the setting of life have a psychological tempo of their own, shaking the mind out of old moorings and setting it on new types of creative enterprise. Reconstruction offers as a purpose a wide world of affections and interests. It turns the gaze from what is becoming obsolete to what contains potentialities of development from the past to the future. Psychologically, a decisive step is registered in the solution of problems bequeathed by history, when the attitude of looking backward is replaced by one of looking forward. A glimpse of extended horizons raises man's spirit above what is small and self-centred. Habitual co-operation establishes habits of reciprocal adaptation, an atmosphere of personal acquaintance

and mutual understanding. It enables social life to grow through continuous assimilation of new elements and evoke for itself appropriate "psychic dominants" as Professor Lamprecht calls them. The Hindu-Muslim questions emerge in this context as part of the greater problem of reorganisation. They are seen to admit of effective and permanent solution or rather of virtual disappearance in terms of reforms which are eminently worthwhile for their own sake. Statesmanship touches genius when it employs means which constitute ends in themselves.

A NEW SYNTHESIS

Civilisation has frequently alternated between emphasis on criticism and on construction. An acute transition from one set of habits and institutions to another may be described as a period of criticism. Inevitably there is some delay in the discovery of new ideas and values in harmony with changed circumstances and, therefore, appropriate to the building up of a new institutional framework. The very rigidity of the old order is sometimes found to have weakened the power of intelligent adaptation. Nevertheless, the breakdown of one adjustment has to be followed by another. The new adjustment can, under inadequate or unwise guidance, touch a lower plane than the present. Under wise and adequate guidance, it can rise to a higher plane. It is here that the element of judgment and choice enters the field of social evolution. It is possible for man to turn the corner in the midst of a crisis and build up a new synthesis.

IMMEDIATE START

From the standpoint of Hindu-Muslim relations as well as from other standpoints, it is desirable to start on reconstruction immediately without waiting for the conclusion of the war.

CHAPTER V

CULTURAL INTEGRATION

NEED OF UNDERSTANDING

IN any plan of *rapprochement* it is necessary, first of all, to get round the barriers which shut off sympathy and comprehension. The future of Hindu-Muslim relations depends partly on success in removing the obstacles interposed by exclusiveness and revivalism to the free association of members of all communities. To understand all is to forgive all, while a want of understanding inclines the mind to indiscriminate suspicion. It is common, for instance, to find a quiet assumption among the Hindus that every riot is the outcome of a Muslim conspiracy, while every Muslim assumes that it is the direct result of Hindu machinations. The human mind has always associated the strange and the unknown with the hateful and the terrible. Political life inevitably reflects cultural attitudes and aspirations and admits of peaceful adjustment with an ease roughly in proportion to cultural integration. It is a matter partly of long-range tendencies and efforts and partly of conscious accommodation and thus comprises the second category of Hindu-Muslim problems.

COMMON EDUCATION

It is scarcely necessary to point out that the foundations of mutual comprehension and, therefore, of practical agreement and working co-operation are well and truly laid in early life. The educational process as a whole has been described by Professor Adams as "the absorbing and being absorbed by the environment." The school, as select environment, is a means to the growth of co-operation within the circle from which scholars are drawn. The environment in education, as in politics,

should be conterminous with society as a whole. It follows that not only should public schools be accessible to all on equal terms but that denominational institutions—schools, colleges, hostels and universities—should open their doors wide to students of all communities. Boy scouts and girl guides trained on the national, as distinct from the sectarian, basis should imbibe habits of large-scale co-operation. Similarly, it is desirable to organise sporting clubs, teams and matches on non-communal lines.

THE QUESTION OF LANGUAGE

Common education presupposes a common medium and raises the whole question of language. Language touches life in all its departments and is, therefore, closely bound up with sentiment. It constitutes the central point in every cultural adjustment. All history bears witness to the unifying or harmonising influence of a common language. The last hundred years have demonstrated in Europe that nothing is resented so keenly and resisted so desperately as an attack, real or fancied, on one's language. In India the class structure, the educational inequalities, the need of country-wide media of literary expression and the exigencies of politics have been reflected for more than two thousand years in the distinction between the commonly spoken languages and the literary languages, Sanskrit (after the age of Panini), Pali, Persian and, lastly, English. These have served a great national purpose ; they have enabled the educated, literary or priestly classes to communicate with one another all over the country ; they have mediated the growth of national religions, cultures, literatures, schools of art and systems of administration. But they have also implied a distance between the upper ten and the masses below. They created a tradition of a sharp difference between the literary and spoken idioms which still persists. The position was modified greatly but not completely by the steady rise of the spoken languages to the

literary status during the last five centuries. The classics retained their predominance in education until they were supplanted by English increasingly after the first quarter of the last century.

HINDU AND URDU

The influences which keep the literary and spoken forms apart are for the most part responsible also for the gap between the Urdu and Hindi forms of the language in the North. Initially, the difference in the scripts—Devanagari and Arabic—draws Hindi towards Sanskrit and Urdu towards Arabic and Persian. Secondly, traditions die harder in literature than anywhere else. The dominance of the religious theme fosters a tendency towards Sanskritisation or Arabicisation. The high-flown style stands in the way of a full currency for the language of the people. Thirdly, the natural tendency of the vernaculars to free themselves from the domination of Sanskrit and Arabic was counteracted by the twofold revivalism which sought a grip on education and culture. Revivalism tends to make Hindi an exclusively Hindu concern and Urdu an increasingly Muslim concern. Fourthly, the decisive feature in the situation has been the very slow progress of literacy, so that books and newspapers have been addressed to a small upper class. If education had been universalised, literature would have adapted itself through the use of common and simple terms to the comprehension of the masses. As it is, literature has been mainly a class affair with no mass impact to detach it from the domination of antique erudition. Fifthly, in modern as in ancient times political tendencies often fight their battles in the realm of language and literature. Separate electorates intervened to widen the gulf between Hindi and Urdu at one of the most important stages of their development. Common political life in joint electorates would have fostered a common vocabulary on the platform, in the press, in political literature and, therefore, in literature as a whole. Separate electorates, however, created separate platforms,

separate newspapers, separate pamphlets and literatures in general. Revivalism and nationalism alike discourage the adoption of European terms which may become a common possession of the two languages. The cinema has certainly tended to develop a common language, but it is not yet strong enough to influence literary style.

LITERARY PURISM

Literary purism, that is, the movement for eliminating the so-called exotic terms, is usually inspired by political motives. For instance, anti-Semitism and Pan-Turanianism have been responsible for the elimination of Arabic terms from Turkish during the last few years. Anti-Semitism and Pan-Iranism have fostered a movement for taking Persian back to the sixth century A.D. Political separatism is partly responsible in India for the divergence of Hindi and Urdu from each other. A *tour de force* in Sanskritisation or Arabicisation seems to promise all the exhilaration of a communal triumph. Finally, there supervenes a real difficulty: the ordinary language, neglected and impoverished, does not lend itself readily to high-class poetry and scientific or philosophic exposition.

THE INADEQUACY OF 'LIVE AND LET LIVE'

The net result of these tendencies—the age-long tradition of a distinction between the spoken and literary idioms, the difference in scripts, the theological influences, persistence of old literary forms, revivalism, separate electorates and above all the low percentage of literacy—is to incline the Hindu literary class towards Sanskrit influences and the Muslim literary class towards Persian and Arabic. The linguistic situation has begun to cause communal difficulties in Bengal, Sind and elsewhere. The matter is especially important in the case of the Northern language variously called Hindi, Urdu or Hindustani because

it is spoken by about a hundred millions in the North and understood more or less by another hundred millions in the Deccan and the South, and because it has been selected by a general consensus of opinion to be the *lingua franca* of the country. It is often urged that Hindi and Urdu be left to develop on their own lines, that it is futile to create an artificial language and that the solution of the problem consists in the policy of 'live and let live.' The bilingual argument, however, suffers from a fundamental fallacy, psychological and sociological. It regards society as a mechanical co-existence of divergent groups rather than as an organic whole. It may be admitted at once that contract forms an important element in social relationships, but philosophy freed itself long ago from the seventeenth-century contractualist view of the foundations and the character of social life. Society is a psychic process, a mental interrelation, an interdependent whole, striving for harmony and depending for efficiency on the degree of harmony achieved. It is the essential character of society that is responsible for the tendency of those who live permanently together to speak and write more or less the same language. Whatever checks this natural tendency strikes at the foundations of society. Linguistic divergence between neighbours does more than anything else to weaken the consciousness of kind which is the essential force in the community. To put the same thing differently, behaviour which stops at correctness where cordiality is expected may inflict a deeper wound than downright hostility. In spite of the best intentions at the start, 'live and let live,' as a substitute for organic integration, resolves itself imperceptibly into an attempt at domination on one side or on both and merges into the wider game of power politics as in pre-war and post-war Europe. Linguistic imperialism may cut as deep as political or economic and set the mind on the road to secession. It is necessary, therefore, to liberate the social organism from the disintegrating influence of those factors which counteract the natural tendency of neighbourhood towards a common idiom.

RECOGNITION OF BOTH THE ARABIC AND DEVANAGARI SCRIPTS

As to the script, the primary school may familiarise every student with both the Arabic and the Devanagari within the jurisdiction of the Northern language. A slight exertion in learning a second script will furnish the key to a whole literature and pave the way for communal understanding. If learnt by all, the scripts will not be looked upon as exclusively denominational.

PARTIAL ADOPTION OF THE ROMAN SCRIPT

A more radical solution suggests itself in the form of the adoption of the Roman script. Now that the country has been drawn irrevocably into world affairs, it must devise adequate means of understanding world affairs. Whatever the future relations of England and India may be, the need of learning English and other foreign languages will grow in urgency and intensity. The certainty of larger and larger numbers of Indians—Hindus, Musalmans and others—learning the Latin alphabet suggests the desirability of universalising it here as in Turkey in 1931. A careful system of diacritical signs has adapted it to precise and faultless transliteration; many hundreds of Sanskrit, Arabic and Pali books have been published in the Roman script in Europe. If it were adopted for the Indian languages, it will not entail any phonetic inadequacy; it will not excite any of the particularist jealousies, provincial or communal. It will facilitate the learning of several languages without the serious initial difficulty of mastering a new script; it will mean an enormous saving of time in the long run; it will tend to draw all the languages nearer. On the other hand, the adoption of the Roman script runs counter to nationalist as well as revivalist sentiment; it has the appearance of yet another surrender to British imperialism or European encroachment.

It may be that its chances will improve with the attainment of national freedom, but in any case it may be useful to recognise it as one of the two or more scripts for schools, law-courts and other institutions. The option may serve to untie many a little knot and facilitate a smooth working of institutions.

THE COINING OF TECHNICAL TERMS

Turning from the script to literature, it may be pointed out that all the Indian languages to-day are confronted with the task of devising suitable technical terms for the physical and social sciences. Hindi is drawing mainly on Sanskrit and Urdu mainly on Arabic, so that the two are drifting farther apart. A more appropriate, indeed a more natural, expedient is first to explore ordinary speech for technical expressions. A great many terms in mathematics, science and philosophy would thus become common to Hindi and Urdu and also raise the status of both. On failure of the resources of ordinary speech, Sanskrit, Persian and Arabic may be drawn upon, if possible, so as to facilitate the adoption of all such terms both in Hindi and Urdu as well as in the other Indian languages. Synonyms may be specialised for the indication of different shades of meaning. But technical terms are now so numerous and have received such precision and definition through long usage by European and American scientists that it is often difficult and sometimes impossible to coin adequate equivalents on a Sanskrit or Arabic basis. In all such cases it seems advisable to borrow freely from the accepted European terminology. It will be a great help to all students, because science is now cultivated in international co-operation and a common glossary has been fixed upon. Such terms will also constitute an important common element in Hindi, Urdu and other Indian languages, and thus bring them all closer together. There is, indeed, one formidable difficulty: European words do not fit readily into the genius and structure of Indian languages which are far removed from

Greek and Latin. But a slight adaptation may overcome the handicap and broaden the bases, without destroying the harmony, of the language. Usage and familiarity will do the rest in due course. Improvement in Hindu-Muslim relations may facilitate the compilation and general acceptance of technical lexicons on the basis of common speech, as well as of Sanskrit, Persian, Arabic and European languages, for Hindi, Urdu and other languages of non-Dravidian origin. In the North an agreed terminology will assist the change from English to the mother-tongue as the medium of instruction up to the university and avoid a duplication costly in money, energy and, above all, in goodwill.

LITERARY CURRENTS

All this, however, is necessarily bound up with the broader question of literary idiom. Leaving out differences of dialect as irrelevant to the purpose, one may distinguish three broad currents in the North, viz., a more or less Sanskritised literary current, a more or less Arabicised Urdu literary current and, lastly, ordinary speech including many words of Sanskrit and Arabic origin without any conscious distinction. The first two tendencies endure, *inter alia*, because the reading public is small and includes a large number with sufficient leisure to learn the elements of a classical language or master a style influenced by it. The expansion of this public through recruitment from unleisured classes is likely to encourage movement towards a simpler terminology and syntax.

GENERAL LITERATURE

As to general literature, then, much depends on the enlargement of the circle of readers through the diffusion of literacy and a consequent rise in the demand for simplified literature. The newspaper, the public platform, the novel, the short story, the theatre and the cinema are likely to free themselves from

classical domination in proportion to their acceptance by a larger and larger clientele. In Hindi and in Urdu, they will wear much the same garb, because they will have approached the genius of common speech. The movement may be immensely accelerated by joint electorates and an improvement in Hindu-Muslim relations. No politician will then find it worth while to address his constituents in Sanskritised Hindi or Arabicised Urdu. The language of common politics is likely to borrow many terms from English, such as the vote, council, assembly, parliament, resolution, adjournment, budget, public, committee, meeting, etc., just as it has already borrowed terms like Congress and League. Both Hindi and Urdu will enrich their vocabulary by reciprocal borrowing. Indeed, every language, like every system of law, is bound to undergo mutations in the course of its expansion. It must either cease to expand or become a confluence of streams that have flowed so far in parallel channels. It is in the course of such an expansion that a language reflects the freshness of popular life, the overflowing vigour of the nation. On the other hand, literary exclusiveness or narrowness often produces malformations and gives the language almost an appearance of debility. As the heat of communal controversy subsides, it will be perceived that Hindi stands to lose by the elimination of Persian terms, short and simple, sweet and easy of pronunciation, and that Urdu stands to lose by the elimination of Sanskrit words characterised by great elegance and expressiveness. As a matter of fact, Hindi poets in the past used several hundred terms of Persian and Arabic origin. On the other side, Dagh, Zauq and Mir and many other Urdu poets composed Ghazals and couplets, masterpieces of neat expression and psychological fidelity, which might pass with equal ease for Hindi and Urdu.

LITERARY STYLES

It is not implied here that the same style can serve for all subjects and all groups or interests. It must vary in accordance

with the mental cultivation and special aptitudes of the public in view. But difference in style is one thing ; artificiality and conscious departure from the common term is another thing. Thus the long compound, so frequent in Sanskrit, is not congenial to Hindi. The Arabic plural which sometimes alters the singular appreciably may not be readily understood by those whose occupation leaves them little leisure for even the rudiments of Arabic. High-flown language often presupposes acquaintance with the elements of Sanskrit or Persian and Arabic grammar. Above all, the tendency to replace the ordinary term by a learned and, it may be, obscure synonym in literature is something very different from that variation in style which is natural to every language. In English, for instance, boy, brother, mountain, water, death, eye, ear, etc., are used by all writers and speakers, whether simple or difficult. Their synonyms, larkâ, bhâi, pahâr, pâni, maut, ânkh, kân, etc., are used by all who speak the Northern language in India. But Hindi writers often replace them by bâlak, bhrâtâ, parvat, jal, mrityu, netra, karna, etc. ; Urdu writers by tîfî, birâdar, koh, âb, wafât, chashm, gosh, etc., thus drawing the two literary idioms apart from common speech and apart from each other. To abandon the ordinary form for the pure Sanskrit or Persian or Arabic form is often tantamount to a reversal of the philological development of several centuries responsible for the divergence between the two. A plea for naturalism is a plea for an acceptance of the philological situation and a free use of all current terms irrespective of their origin. The plea will be immensely reinforced by a wide diffusion of literacy and a consequent recognition of the popular language as the basis of literature. It is also probable that a larger demand for political and social literature may render style less ornate and antique and thus lead to a *rapprochement* between the Hindi and Urdu literary idioms. It may be pointed out that a fondness for the florid is not synonymous with a taste for purity and chasteness of style.

THE POLITICAL ASPECT OF THE LANGUAGE QUESTION

Naturalism may be recommended not only for reasons of literary style but also for those of political amity. If the present artificial tendencies establish themselves as the literary counterpart of political separatism, if Hindi becomes the language of the Hindus alone and if Urdu were to become the language of the Muslims all over India, the religious cleavage will coincide with the linguistic and, therefore, with the cultural. It will constitute a gigantic stride towards a double nationality and make the Hindu-Muslim problem not twice but ten times more difficult. The Swiss analogy occasionally cited in this connection is irrelevant, because the speakers of French, German and Italian inhabit different Cantons or different parts of the same Cantons, while in India the Hindus and the Muslims live together in the same habitat. The real analogy is furnished by Czechoslovakia, where little effort was made towards linguistic harmony, and whose capital, Prague, was the seat of two universities, a purely Czech one and a purely German one: the result was dismemberment and annexation.

LITERARY THEMES

If, on the other hand, the artificialities of terminology and style can be corrected in favour of naturalism, it may harmonise with a community of literary themes. No living literature can be content to elevate dead erudition into a 'semblance of productiveness.' It is prompted by an inner urge to new themes in poetry, fiction, social philosophy, metaphysics and other departments of thought and literary endeavour. As Indian literatures reflect modern life in a greater measure, they will necessarily approach one another in ethos and atmosphere. Hindi and Urdu will then present not opposable sets but a single web of contents.

HUMANISM

In proportion to victory over the centrifugal tendencies, India may contribute to world-culture a humanism of its own, a synthesis of Hindu-Muslim and modernist cultures. As the various elements in culture are appreciated more widely, the highest range of Indian scholarship would comprise familiarity with Sanskrit and Persian or Arabic as well as some European languages and literatures, a familiarity with all that is valuable in ancient India, in the Middle East and in the modern world. Such a humanism alone can adequately replace revivalism; or rather the two revivalisms can, under catholic inspiration, free themselves from the dangers of stagnation and atavism and broaden into a comprehensive cultural stream, drawing the Hindus and the Muslims together to carry them forward into the larger life of humanity. Humanism will represent not a mechanical and piecemeal revival but a genuine revitalisation and expansion of Indian thought and culture—a synthesis of the ideals of the good life, holding together and liberalising society as part of a universal whole.

CHAPTER VI

POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

THE URGENCY OF AN ADJUSTMENT

THE first category of Hindu-Muslim questions depends for solution on quick and planned progress in education, economics and defence. The second category calls for cultural harmony in terms of freedom, humanism and a restraint on artificiality and narrowness. The third category, that of political questions, is inter-linked with the first two, but it also admits in part of an immediate settlement through negotiation and compromise among the leading national or communal organisations, the princes and the British Government. It is scarcely necessary to dilate again on the urgency of a political solution.

WAR AND REFORM

It has already been pointed out that political unsettlement since 1927 is a major cause of the present impasse. It may be permitted to suggest that the policy of postponing difficult questions until the close of a war has been rendered dangerously obsolete by the character and long duration of modern mechanised warfare. It had something to recommend it so long as wars were fought by standing armies alone; it was not altogether out of place until the style of warfare was radically altered in 1914. It may still be tolerable in the case of a short war, lasting a few weeks or a few months. But the matter assumes a different aspect when a war is waged in a totalitarian manner and spreads over years. It abolishes the distinction between combatants and non-combatants and requires a mobilisation of all the resources and man-power of the belligerents. The call for a contribution from all directs the attention of all to any glaring

imperfection or injustice in the social system and inclines the mind towards reconstruction. If longstanding controversies are not set at rest, they may provoke acute discontent and explosion at any of the crises that are incidental to hostilities extending over several years. A prolonged stalemate tends to destroy the faith in rational methods and favours the importation into domestic politics of the spirit of lawlessness rampant in international dealings. War, in this context, appears as a spur rather than as a halt to domestic reform. This is the explanation of the changes lately effected or under discussion in England, the United States, and elsewhere, in the domains of education, insurance and economic control including socialisation. There is yet another important consideration pointing in the same direction. The duration, intensity and totalitarian character of modern war entail a reorganisation of all industry, finance, employment and social relationships in terms of its own requirements. The outbreak of peace may, therefore, bring as many problems of adjustment as the outbreak of war. Public and parliamentary bodies alike should be able to deal with them unoppressed by the burdens of a by-gone age. The difficulty of settlement is bound to increase by the addition to post-war problems of those which ought to have found their solution either before the war or during the war.

THE STATE AND CIVIL DISSENSIONS

Neither in war nor in peace can the state afford to look calmly at civil dissensions. Genuine statehood consists in constructive co-ordination and, therefore, in "operative criticism," including ultimate arbitration and regulation, of the working of groups, associations and institutions. It is essential to effect those political changes in India which may heal the schism between the communities, settle long-standing questions, and liberate energies in all their plenitude for defence and social advance. British policy which makes political progress contingent

on prior agreement, is an over-simplification or rather a reversal of the psychological process. Experience everywhere demonstrates that a settlement, which is imperfect, without being altogether unjust, usually calls forth an effort at adjustment from every quarter and may soon be followed by a working agreement. It may shift the contention from the pursuit of power to the purpose to which power is to be put and thus facilitate economic development and the emergence of genuinely political, as distinct from religious, parties. It may relax the tight discipline now deemed necessary for a united front, allow the formation of parties within the Congress or the Muslim League and lead composite Hindu-Muslim parties to contest elections against each other. The supreme need of Indian politics at the moment is to get the wheels of progress revolving again. Delay is drawing into controversy much that had so far been taken for granted—the unity of India, the need of harmony among the communities, the necessity of federation, the desirability of parliamentary government, secularity in politics, etc. Further delay may precipitate chaos or raise a clear issue of the domination of the Hindus by the Musalmans or *vice versa* and create a very serious difficulty also for the British Government during and after the war. A correct appreciation of the internal and external situation is already inducing a mood of compromise in many political circles. John Morley enunciated in his radical days a maxim, which holds true of all times, that politics is one long second-best. If the good is sometimes the enemy of the better, the best is sometimes an ally of the worst.

RALLYING POWER OF AN EQUITABLE ADJUSTMENT

It is true that delays have served to raise claims and threats to a high pitch and that no adjustment may now command immediate and universal assent, but if it is intrinsically equitable it is likely soon to rally moderate elements in all quarters and gradually to attract the whole country round its institutions.

Equity may render it strong enough to get the better of sheer intransigence. The fumes of controversy need not obscure the substratum of common-sense and patriotism in the country.

TERRITORIAL STABILITY

A basis of political advance must be sought, first of all, in stabilisation of the Indian provincial system. A real redistribution of boundaries on the linguistic basis is impracticable so long as the Indian states endure. Nor is it desirable in itself. The idea of linguistic redistribution awakens separatist tendencies in very small groups on the basis of dialects. Nor is it expedient to support schemes of dividing the country into seven zones as suggested by the late Sir Sikandar Hy-at Khan, into five zones as suggested by Sir Feroz Khan Noon, or four as suggested on the regional and economic and partly cultural bases by Prof. R. Coupland in his report on 'The Constitutional Problem in India.' True, the internal frontiers of India partly represent incidents in the history of British occupation, but they have since gathered sentiments and loyalties, traditions and interests round them. To attempt a territorial redistribution is to stir a nest of hornets and divert attention for long from the more urgent tasks of political emancipation, economic amelioration and educational expansion. It can be followed up only at the risk of atomising the country. It weakens the will to reciprocal adjustments among groups who do not differ radically from one another and who can easily learn to live in amity. The present provincial system, in short, may be accepted as a settled fact and form the foundation of a federal structure.

DECLARATION OF RIGHTS

It lies beyond the scope of this pamphlet to outline a constitution for India. It is necessary to touch only on a few points from the standpoint of Hindu-Muslim relationships. One of

the most important aspects of the problem is that of security. It is one of the prime functions of statesmanship to guarantee to every group as complete security of civil, economic and political rights as possible. Whatever constitutions be set up for India as a whole or for the states or provinces, every one of them must include a declaration of rights, guaranteeing to all freedom of religious belief and worship, language and culture, rights to education, association and public meeting, secrecy of communication, subject to public order and morality, equality before the law and equality of civil and political rights. They must, secondly, incorporate the communal settlements which may be arrived at, so as to place them beyond infringement by the executive or any majority in the legislature.

DISTRIBUTION OF FUNCTIONS

In regard to the distribution of functions between the centre and the provinces or states, it is desirable to satisfy Muslim aspiration in regard to autonomy to the farthest point compatible with common safety and administrative efficiency. It may, therefore, be explicitly recognised that the component units shall not be subordinate to whatever federal government may be set up, but as in the United States and the Australian Commonwealth they shall enjoy sovereignty in the exercise of powers and functions vested in them by the constitution. To them should belong matters appertaining to religious, cultural and civil rights, subject, of course, to effective guarantees for all minorities.

EXCLUSIVE PROVINCIAL JURISDICTION

Their jurisdiction should be complete and exclusive on education in all its grades and branches—libraries, museums, use of language and literature, theatres, cinemas, music-halls, etc. They should control agriculture, land revenue, taxes on land, forests, mines, fisheries, co-operative societies.

profession, trade, etc., taxes on luxuries, entertainments, betting and gambling, toll-tax, death and succession duties, etc. Similarly, they should control local-self-government, hospitals, asylums, clinics, public works and local communications financed from their revenues, gas and water-works, war-relief and unemployment. They should also be entrusted with the maintenance of law and order. Their jurisdiction may be constitutionally complete on electrification, irrigation, rivers, excise, for instance on salt and tobacco, health, temperance, social hygiene and statistics. But it will be desirable on their part to arrange deliberative and administrative co-ordination in the interests of efficiency in regard to these eight subjects.

CONCURRENT JURISDICTION

There are, however, matters which affect the whole country or the greater part of it and call for large-scale organisation or compulsory co-operation among autonomous units. It is obviously desirable that identical principles should continue to govern transport and communication and, therefore, be laid down by a common authority. Strategic and economic considerations alike render it necessary that a central authority should plan transport and communication and control their major means, while leaving feeder-roads and railways as well as some coastal shipping to the autonomous units. The same principle applies to currency and exchange. Legislative centralisation with administrative decentralisation is obviously suited to marriage, divorce, etc., copyrights and census and survey, customs, social insurance, factory codes and economic planning. All such subjects may be put under concurrent jurisdiction.

DEFENCE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

In a world which is still organised for war and not for perpetual peace and in which diplomatic moves are fraught with

immense consequences, it is necessary to provide for effective defence and foreign policy. The requirements can be fulfilled in India not through organisations patterned on the Imperial Conference or the League of Nations, but only through regular organs of legislation and administration capable of developing the moral and material resources and mobilising them for instantaneous and concentrated use.

SUMMARY

It follows from this analysis that there shall be only five subjects of exclusively federal jurisdiction, viz., (1) Foreign Affairs, (2) Defence, (3) The principal means of Transport and Communication, (4) Customs for the most part, (5) Currency and Exchange for the most part. A variety of subjects fall under concurrent jurisdiction while all others shall pertain exclusively to the autonomous units with the option of joint consultation and co-operation with regard to some of them and it may be with the option of making over some of them to the Union Government.

RESIDUARY POWERS

Residuary powers shall appertain to the autonomous units or to the Union in accordance with their affinity to the items in their respective jurisdictions, that is, in accordance with the doctrine of implied powers enunciated, for instance, by Chief Justice Marshall of the American Supreme Court (1800-1835). It is understood that any differences that may arise in regard to interpretation between the Union and the autonomous units shall be decided by the Union Court in India. Residuary powers that may fall outside the justiciable range shall be vested in the autonomous units. It will be observed that the autonomous units, including those which the Muslim League would like to constitute as an independent Pakistan, will exercise exclusive

jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to civil and political rights and that the Union Government, in the constitution of which they would all share, would guarantee their safety and economic solvency.

JUDICIAL SUPREMACY

The courts of law may be explicitly empowered to declare *ultra vires* any statute or executive act which does not conform to the constitution or which violates its declaration of rights. Judicial review was at first a juridical deduction from the principles of common law in the United States, but it seems desirable to recognise it expressly in any future constitution of India. It follows that the Declaration of Rights and the Communal settlement should be framed with the lawyer's precision of language so that they may be implemented by the courts without much difficulty. It goes without saying that the judiciary must continue to be independent of the executive as well as the legislature.

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT

The constitutions may be open to amendment only by a two-thirds majority in either chamber of the legislature so that amendment may always be contingent on the support of the Muslims and other minorities. Besides, any amendment of the declaration of rights or the communal settlement should also require the approval of a two-thirds majority of the Musalmans as well as the other minorities. Recent European experience has certainly demonstrated the futility of constitutional guarantees in the face of a revolutionary movement and international entanglements, but, normally, such guarantees should serve to promote communal harmony as well as to foster political temperance and constitutional habits of action.

SCIENCE AND GOVERNMENT

Democratic Government for four hundred millions is an experiment unprecedented in history. Its sublimity touches the imagination; its risks and difficulties are correspondingly heavy. It can be tried only with adequate safeguards—not so much in the sense of checks and balances which impede the legislative machinery and undermine governmental efficiency, nor in the sense of special powers and responsibilities which can at best be temporary and withal irritating—but in the sense of calling knowledge and science into intimate association with government. Self-government succeeds only if it can effectively enlist the brain power as well as awaken all the resources of goodwill that exist in the country.

LIMITATIONS OF PUBLIC OPINION

Besides an equitable distribution of powers and the association of science with government, it is also necessary to prescribe the composition and functions of the organs of government so as to maximise the chance of co-operation and minimise those of friction among the various communities.

Democracy is sometimes defined as government by public opinion. But no government, least of all a positive government engaging in multifarious activities, can be altogether an affair of opinion. Opinion pertains properly to judgments of value as distinct from judgments of science, and, therefore, to that aspect of government which consists in the definition of ends. Here, too, opinion stands in need of the utmost assistance from knowledge, garnered by social scientists. In any case, once the ends have been determined, the sphere of opinion ends, and that of knowledge begins. Knowledge, that is, *expertise*, has to join the ends with the means, to settle how the ends shall be given effect to. Opinion may prescribe in outline *what* ought to be done; knowledge has to determine, in a precise and

systematic manner, *how* it ought to be done. Public opinion must prescribe high standards of conduct all round and see to it that those entrusted with power not only exert it in the public interest but also set an example of blameless private life and integrity. Beyond it, public opinion has only one other function, general criticism to make sure that the ends have been carried out. As a factor in politics, the public cannot be omniscient; it must have a definite role and discharge it. A political organ which may deal with anything, with everything or with nothing, lends itself easily to designing intrigue and manipulation; it becomes the tool of caucuses, rings and bosses.

PUBLIC OPINION AND POPULAR POWER

It is scarcely necessary to dilate on the magnitude of the role of public opinion or on the importance of fitting the public for its fulfilment. The problem is how to convert the formless, dispersed, inchoate popular power—the raw material so to say—into an efficient and enlightened democracy. If the problem is not tackled in a rational way, popular power may turn out to be a self-cancelling business and annihilate itself. The solution lies in the diffusion of education and the permeation of social, specially economic and political, organisation with the educational principle. Secondly, opinion tends to follow social cleavages, and if these turn on accidents of birth, race or religion, opinion remains sectional and never attains to the rank of public opinion. It is patent that political leadership takes its colour from the character of opinion and that sectional or ignorant opinion evokes narrow-minded leadership and unscrupulous propaganda. The approximation of opinion to the ideal of Rousseau's General Will in point of generality and disinterestedness depends largely on the approximation of society to the standards of social justice. Justice has often been described as the right ordering of human relations—an ordering which would assist every one to realise his personality. The social good involves an equilibration

of all the interests of every one in the light of all the interests of every one else. Universal education, equality of opportunity, social justice, genuine public opinion, democratic government and scientific administration—all these are parts of a single political process which has yet to attain completion in any state. They imply a public life dominated not by passion and aggrandisement but by morality and reason—free from passive intolerance as well as from active fanaticism. In proportion to high mass education and social justice, will popular power bring itself into form through judgment and self-control, perceive its own limitations, and integrate itself with knowledge? It is not necessary that every man should be a scientist, an expert, but it is necessary that he should understand the scientific method and confide in its worth. Politics would not then be a gamble; the plain man and the expert alike would cease to be the play-things of public life. To the art of the statesman the plain man should be able to apply the judgment that he applies to the art of the shoemaker or the tailor without himself being the one or the other. No form of government can endure in the modern age which is not built on an intelligent collaboration between the citizen's sense of values and the expert's choice of means.

THE ROLE OF THE LEGISLATURE

The auto-limitation of public opinion must be accompanied by a self-denying ordinance, reinforced by organic or legal restriction, on the part of the modern legislature. During the long transition from autocracy, monarchic and oligarchic, to constitutional and popular rule, the legislature attempted a detailed formulation of policy, a vast amount of purely executive business and a minute supervision over various departments of administration. Perhaps the nature of the executive and the trends of opinion left it no alternative, but the recent breakdown of parliamentary government suggests that the legislature attempted too much and attempted it in too dilatory a manner.

It misjudged its competence and powers and failed to grasp the imperative need of associating science with government, and of committing administration in a far greater measure to trained *expertise*.

Representative government arose and flourished for long in Europe as middle-class government, but as the fourth estate, the working class or proletariat, came up, and the scope of state-activity tended to coincide with the whole of social life, it became desirable to revise the technique of organisation. The revision, however, was delayed by inertia and the force of tradition. As a result, representative government reeled under the strain everywhere and broke down in the present century, particularly in those countries in which it had not taken firm root such as Russia, Italy, Germany, Spain, Yugoslavia, Portugal, etc. Reform of parliamentary procedure, so as to make for greater thinking and greater dispatch, is one of the most urgent tasks that confront statesmanship in countries that have not yet swung to dictatorial régimes. It must be tackled by every state in the light of its own conditions; obviously large allowance has to be made for transitional stages. But two general propositions suggest themselves: firstly, government is an organic whole and has to function effectively and expeditiously and cannot afford the network of checks and balances that seemed to accord with the intellectual atmosphere dominated by Newtonian physics. Secondly, the legislature has to be not merely a will-organisation but also a thought-organisation, to take affairs in the large-scale perspective of human purposes, and to restrict itself to ends and policies. It must be a receptacle of ideas and be surrounded by organisations which would work out projects for its consideration and which would play an advisory role without detracting from its responsibility and celerity of action. Already, the creative element in legislation, as in administration, comes largely from beyond the regular mechanism of government. It is desirable to regularise and replenish the supply. Thus, the second chamber can represent

functional associations and ventilate their ideas. It may be the apex of an hierarchy of functional organisations—central, provincial and local—which, besides sustaining pride in the craft and looking after the interests of their members, can assist the formulation and adaptation of plans of economic welfare. An advisory economic council can bring ministers and leaders of functional unions into touch with experts. The apparent complexity of these arrangements is hardly an argument against them; our complex civilisation requires a complex political constitution; an over-simplified machinery is a crime against it. Besides, advisory bodies, while letting in a flow of ideas, do not deprive the legislature or the executive of any part of its responsibility.

THE EXECUTIVE

Similarly, the modern executive calls for reorganisation in accordance with the principle of rationalisation, that is, permeation with boards of experts, not of mere civil servants, but of trained, scientific experts. Here we touch one of the cardinal errors of democratic government and one of the most potent causes of its eclipse during the last twenty-eight years. It acquiesced in a system of administration adapted to negative and aristocratic government of the pre-industrial era. It was content to be mainly a corrective to despotism, monarchic or oligarchic. We are now realising that the determination of ends should be followed by the selection and execution of means by experts and that the political Cabinet should normally confine itself to general co-ordination. The modern executive has to comprise autonomous boards—Planning Commissions, Public Services Commissions, Investment Boards, Railway, Transport, Electricity, Tariff, Marketing, Agricultural, Education Boards, and others. They would consist of members appointed by the Cabinet for a fixed term, say five or seven years, eligible for reappointment. They would not be responsible to the legislature

BOARD OF CONCILIATION

Further, it is desirable to set up a Board of Conciliation which shall offer advisory opinions on any communal matters that may be referred to it by the legislature or by the Government and which shall also study problems and offer suggestions on its own initiative. It may be elected partly by the representatives of the various communities in proportion to their numerical quota in the legislature. For the rest, it may consist of co-opted members. Such a board may acquire great influence and a recognised place in the political mechanism. It will tend to take communal controversy out of the legislature and facilitate compromise behind closed doors.

GOODWILL COMMITTEES

The Board of Conciliation may be assisted in its functions by Goodwill Committees in towns and, wherever necessary, in districts, tahsils or villages, constituted on a permanent basis and consisting of members nominated by the district officers. Organisation would multiply the efficacy of the efforts which numerous individual peacemakers are constantly making. Christians, Parsis and others who may be expected to bring a detached outlook to bear on Hindu-Muslim questions can play the role of the smoother through such committees.

THE COMMUNAL AWARD AND THE POONA PACT

It is necessary to stabilise the proportion of the communities in the legislatures, both federal and provincial. There are four conditions of a general character which a communal settlement must satisfy in order to be durable and conducive to social harmony :

(1) It must not reduce the representation of a minority below its numerical proportion ; (2) it must give a reasonable weightage to minorities in an inverse proportion to their

numbers; (3) the weightage must not be so large as to jar on the sense of justice and fairness and require the exertion of force rather than an appeal to the twin principles of justice and political expediency for its maintenance; (4) it must not reduce a majority to a minority or to equality with the minorities as a whole anywhere.

On these considerations it is desirable to accept the Communal Award and the Poona Pact of 1932 for the most part. A revision, however, is clearly called for in the case of Bengal where the Muslim majority has been reduced to a minority and the Hindu minority to a yet smaller minority in the legislature, the balance being held by the European and other groups which have been awarded a disproportionately large number of seats.

REPRESENTATION IN THE FEDERAL LEGISLATURE

The communal proportion in the Federal Legislature is complicated by the probable inclusion of Indian states in the Federation. But in regard to British India it seems desirable to accept the British Government's decision announced in 1932 to allot one-third of the seats to Musalmans, *inter alia*, on the ground that a revision would provoke keen controversy and embitter public life. On the other hand, it is necessary to sound a note of warning against the demand for equal representation of Hindus and Musalmans in the centre or in any of the provinces. Political settlements which flagrantly violate the sense of fairness can be sustained only by force—force which creates more problems than it can solve. It postulates perpetual British control and, therefore, nullification of self-government. It entails the possibility of the British Government getting tired of the job of upholding an inequitable settlement and letting it fall to pieces. Secondly, the grant of a 50 per cent. of the seats to Musalmans will lead the other minorities, the Christians, the Sikhs, the Parsis and, it may be, the depressed classes, to demand a disproportionately large number of seats

so that a satisfactory settlement would always remain beyond reach. In the third place, a 50 per cent. share in the Federal Legislature and Executive will expose the Muslim minority to perpetual misunderstanding. In every age and country a government provokes criticism. It can never expect to fulfil all expectations and can never escape the necessity of disappointing many groups and individuals. A disproportionately large share of this criticism and resentment will fall upon any disproportionately large Muslim element in the Government. It may rally the Musalmans especially to the support of the Government and confirm an attitude of loyalism. On the other hand, a government reflecting communal proportions with only reasonable weightage will secure to all a fair share of praise and blame and will not create any special denominational difficulties.

SAFEGUARDED JOINT ELECTORATES

As regards the mode of election, the consequences of separate electorates suggest their replacement as early as possible by joint electorates with reservation of seats, pure and simple. But it is not given to the present generation to write on a clean slate. So long as that device is not acceptable to Muslim opinion, it may be desirable to observe some safeguards. It may be permitted to adapt a formula enunciated by the late Maulana Mohammad Ali and others many years ago. A unity conference held at Allahabad in December 1932 recommended as a transitional measure, "That out of the candidates who have secured at least 30 per cent. of the votes polled of their own community, the candidate who secures the highest number of votes polled on the joint electoral role shall be declared elected. In case there is no candidate who has secured 30 per cent of votes polled of his own community, then, out of the two candidates who secure the highest number of votes of their own community, that candidate shall be declared elected who secures the highest number of votes of the total votes polled."

Or it may be agreed that the election of a Hindu or a Musalman be contingent on securing at least 20 or 25 per cent. or some other agreed percentage of the votes cast by members of either community. Such a provision should serve to make the representatives true to the interests of both the communities and, at the same time, guarantee that the Muslims shall not be mere nominees of the Hindus or *vice versa*. The Mohammad Ali formula was, however, found unacceptable, *inter alia*, because it made no provision for the contingency of the specific conditions not being satisfied by any of the candidates. It is possible that a multiplicity of candidates may render it impossible for any candidate to win the requisite number of votes from either community. In that case the seat may go to the candidate who has secured a larger number of the votes of his own community than any other candidate. In this contingency, then, the separate electorate will come into play without the awkward necessity of a second election. Essentially a compromise, the scheme is open to objection on theoretical grounds, but it may serve to give joint electorates a chance without destroying the advantages claimed for separate electorates. It may form the starting-point of advance and extricate the country from the present deadlock.

INDIRECT ELECTION

It seems worth while to try several kinds of election in India not only because experiment alone will reveal the degree of their suitability to local conditions but also because some of them offer a mitigation of the disadvantages of mass elections as well as of separate electorates and even of safeguarded joint electorates. Indirect election has much to recommend it, but it is not suitable for universal adoption. It removes the representatives sometimes several degrees from the electorate and enfeebles their sense of responsibility. It deprives the democratic process of a great deal of educative value. It introduces national or provincial issues into all lower elections

and tightens the grip of party on the primary voter. It often implies small constituencies open to purchase by wealth or to domination by caucus. Indirect election has, therefore, to be used with great caution. On a balance of consideration it seems to lend itself to the composition of Taluk or Tahsil Boards and District Boards. These may be elected by a college of electors consisting of one representative each for a large village or a cluster of neighbouring villages and voting according to a plan of proportional representation together with a guarantee of the agreed communal proportion. A tahsil or a district is too large to develop a community life like that of a village or a city. It is too small to be self-sufficing for any essential services. It is primarily a unit of administrative convenience. It may be expected to gain rather than lose from indirect election. The plan may save the country-side from a great deal of the communal estrangement attendant on completely or partly separate elections.

FUNCTIONAL REPRESENTATION

A parallel scheme of proportional representation can be applied on the functional basis to the composition of second chambers and other advisory bodies in the federation as well as in the provinces or states. Alternatively, the safeguarded joint electorate outlined above may be introduced to secure the agreed quota of representatives of all communities. The unifying principle of function will here partly neutralise the evils of separatist electioneering and may in any case form a valuable addition to the political mechanism. Functional representation has not so far been able to overcome the very serious difficulty of fixing the proportion of representatives for the various occupations and can not, therefore, form the basis of the composition of executives or lower chambers of legislatures, but it need not be a deterrent in the case of assemblies which are to exercise influence rather than power. If the second

chambers are assigned mainly an advisory role, they can be elected by functional associations which necessarily cut across lines of caste and religion.

PRIMARY ASSEMBLIES

Yet another method of outgrowing political separatism without detriment to any minority interests is the adoption of direct democracy for all but very large villages and also for a union of small neighbouring villages. The two master requirements, at first sight contradictory but really complementary, of the Indian rural economy to-day are: (1) to revitalise the village as a community and (2) to draw the village into the full orbit of life through universal education, sanitation, improvement in transport, modernisation of agriculture, wherever necessary, through consolidation of holdings, and, wherever feasible, through collectivisation of farms. This reconstruction must enlist in its service all the judgment and organising talent in the countryside through self-government within limits laid down by the provincial legislature. It may be suggested that this self-government should centre as a rule not in a representative council but in the entire body of voters assembling together at stated intervals to pass any bye-laws and to deliberate on village affairs. According to the 1931 census, the average population per village in British India numbers 412. Leaving out minors, this would mean an average membership of 200 for a village assembly on the adult basis, while the actual attendance is not likely to exceed a hundred. As the Greeks discovered long ago, a familiar rural environment is the most favourable unit for self-government. Administrative stability as well as minority interests can be protected by a proviso that important decisions and the election of important officers like the headman and chairmen of committees shall be contingent on a two-thirds majority and that the membership of committees shall follow the agreed communal ratio.

NOMINATION AS A PART SUBSTITUTE FOR ELECTION

Finally, it is necessary to guard against too heavy a strain on the electoral machine, whether in primary habitations, districts or provinces. It is a misinterpretation of the democratic principle to insist on election for all sorts of posts. Most of the honorary posts can be filled up by chairmen through nomination, while recruitment for most of the paid ones can follow the principle of competitive examinations with an agreed minimum guaranteed by the organic law or statutory enactment to minorities.

THE SERVICES, BOARDS AND COMMITTEES

As a rule, the four principles suggested above for the legislature also admit of application to such Boards and Committees as may be associated with the various branches and sections of the administration. It may be laid down that recruitment to all services, including those in the District, Municipal or other local organisations shall be made by autonomous Public Services Commissions, and, so far as possible, on the basis of specific competitive examinations, not only in order to ensure a high standard of efficiency but also to furnish an incentive to high education, to rid the executive of a temptation and a worry, to protect public life from demoralisation and to remove a frequent cause of communal misunderstanding. It may not be irrelevant to point out that non-official institutions, recruiting their employees from all denominations, would enrich their life and help to confirm a feeling of security and confidence.

"SCOTCH VOTES"

A few of the conventions that arose in England to determine the exercise of power within the legal framework have been incorporated into the organic law of the Dominions and other

countries. From the standpoint of Hindu-Muslim relations it seems advisable to adopt the so-called Scotch Vote which confines debate and voting on purely Scotch affairs practically to Scotch members in the House of Commons. In India, affairs concerning the personal law or culture of a single community may be settled by its own representatives forming something like a standing committee for the purpose. If the minorities do not object, this committee may be slightly expanded through the addition of a few others not more than 10 per cent. of its total membership. Such a provision will form a valuable part of the system of cultural guarantees. Any doubt as to whether a matter concerns a single community or more, or really falls within the purview of personal law shall be decided by the presiding officer of the lower chamber in consultation with the Board of Conciliation. It may be added that the whole system of safeguards can be applied *mutatis mutandis* to all minorities in India as a whole or in the provinces or states.

NECESSARY CONVENTIONS

A few conventions may also be adopted for the purpose of minimising the chances of communal friction and at the same time of improving the quality of government. The High Command at the party headquarters should relax its hold on provincial governments. Such centralised control, exerted in a rigid manner, diminishes the influence which the minority parties might otherwise exercise through the ordinary legislative channels. Neither a coalition ministry, nor provincial autonomy, nor even the federal government will have a smooth run unless the party high commands pass a self-denying ordinance in regard to their working. A high command, set up by one party, is prone to violent clash against high commands set up by other parties. They place the legislators, especially in the provinces, in the difficult position of bearing a double allegiance, to the

provincial coalition and to one of the all-India high commands. They lower the prestige of provincial premiers and cabinets. Above all, they do not admit of that give and take which is the sovereign merit of the parliamentary, specially the committee, system and which blunts the edge of party strife. It may, therefore, be suggested that as soon as coalition ministries are set up, the high commands should resolve to refrain from control over them. Secondly, the presiding officer of every legislative chamber may follow the British rather than the American example and shake off all party allegiance on reaching the chair. He must refrain rigidly from participation in party counsels or in communal activities. Like Cæsar's wife, he must be above suspicion and take holiday from all controversy. Thirdly, Prime Ministers, Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries should desist from the role of communal champion-ship and function as national umpires. The growth of non-communal parties will strengthen the chances of such a convention. Fourthly, Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries must refrain from entertaining any requests, representations, recommendations or complaints over the heads of the Secretariat or district officials. Fifthly, local party organisations, specially those affiliated to the parties in power for the time being, must scrupulously abstain from interfering with the local administration. Nor should they usurp the function, which properly belongs to district officials, of arranging the programme of Ministers and their assistants on official tours. All such activities are not only derogatory to the administration but also cause heart-burning among the other parties. Sixthly, Government nominations on any central, provincial, or local committees or to honorary magistracies or other dignities must steer clear of party considerations. The government of the day must free itself from all appearances of party raj. Seventhly, no candidates; whatever the party to which they belong, should expect local officials, or the employees of local self-governing boards, to engage in electioneering on their behalf.

BUSINESSLIKE METHODS

Lastly, businesslike methods are necessary for legislatures as well as for public life in general. A modern legislature, overweighed and overwhelmed with business, can scarcely afford the luxury of lengthy inaugural songs. In any case, it is not politically expedient to barter away the prospects of communal harmony literally for a song, howsoever exalted and elevating. Apart from legislatures it is eminently desirable and elevating to incorporate prayer and ritual from all the religions in ceremonies planned to inaugurate public functions like the opening of schools, hospitals, libraries and halls which followers of different religions are invited or expected to attend. It is still more necessary to liberate public life from those features of monarchic pomp and court etiquette which once served as means of encouraging public spirit or of expressing social recognition and respect for certain types of mind and function. Special trains, "profuse" garlanding, unhorsed carriages, beflagged cars, mass receptions, civic addresses and tumultuous processions may be all right on rare occasions such as can scarcely arise more than once in a decade. But when they become frequent, they are clearly out of accord with democratic attitudes. Psychologically, they are a transference to public life of those habits of adulation which are very different from manly appraisal and which are fostered by despotic courts and durbars. They have been rendered especially dangerous by the assumption of responsibility for government by popular leaders. They imply an enormous waste of time in the case of Ministers and other public functionaries. They leave little leisure and less inclination for hard thinking. They tend to establish a very unhealthy relationship between leaders and the public; they weaken the habit of thinking; the exuberant allegiance paralyses the judgment and prompts a line of least resistance. Habituation to reckless homage leads public men to forget that one of the acid tests of statesmanship is the readiness to embark on

unpopular action. It rouses more of self-consciousness than is wholesome for the average mortal. It may even induce a subtle psychological adjustment, making for reluctance to terminate an agitation fruitful of so much acclamation. There was sound instinct behind the practice long maintained by the Roman Republic which expected every citizen and magistrate to do his best as part of his duty and reserved pomp and show for the funeral.

CHAPTER VII .

THE PROSPECT

THE CONTEXT OF THE PROBLEM

HINDU-MUSLIM tension colours all public activity and inactivity and occupies the focus of political consciousness in India to-day. It would be too much to suggest that it is the only serious obstacle to the attainment of self-government. The future of India largely depends also on an expansion and intensification of the patriotic sentiment and on those international developments which go a long way towards determining the attitude of Britain, the United States and other countries towards India. But when allowance has been made for all these considerations, the fact remains that the Hindu-Muslim problem is one of the acutest that we have to deal with. Its ramifications extend to every walk of life and those who seek to cast an account must take adequate scales and measures. A difficulty that can hold up the advance of a fifth of the human race must be suspended in the light of the abiding principles of corporate life, a thousand years of world history and the panorama of international relations. Jauntily to dismiss either community as perverse or hopeless is to misunderstand the foundations of human nature, to mistake passing accidents for permanent elements, to underrate the aspiration to fullness of life and to overlook the capacity for adaptation.

"THIRD PARTY"

Nor is it correct to ascribe to "the third party" the entire responsibility for the creation and, therefore, for the solution of the problem. Religious and social cleavages spring from sources accessible to government and open to its manipulation only in an indirect manner. As a matter of historical fact,

governments reflect the existing differences and seek to correlate their policy to them, with a view either to bridge them or to rely on them. Or, they "muddle through" without bestowing much thought on the claims of social integration. In domestic, imperial and foreign affairs Britain has prided herself on a policy of drift. In the course of piecemeal adjustment to various factors and exigencies of the Indian situation during the last eighty years, the British Government acquiesced in policies and actions calculated to sustain and accentuate the differences between the communities—the omission to eradicate illiteracy and poverty, differential treatment, separate electorates, extraordinary delays in political settlement and, lastly, the inversion of the true order of things by declaring all political advance contingent on prior agreement and investing minorities as such with a veto on it. A foreign government preoccupied with "safety first" is tempted to think of communal dissensions as calculated to lighten its task. What is equally significant, its presence keeps the warring factions from visualising the spectre of anarchy towards which their propaganda may be heading but from which they would, if left to themselves, recoil with horror. If once the Hindus and the Musalmans clearly realise that they have to live together without a third party keeping the ring for them, they would explore avenues of settlement in a chastened mood.

THE BROADER PROBLEM

All this serves to reinforce the contention that the communal problem is part of the broader problem, that of replacing the present system by one more alive to a consistent policy of social concord and of infusing the exercise of power with the moral purpose. Indeed, no discussion on India's future can proceed far without reaching the conclusion that the country needs a government deriving its vitality from the people, devoted to the good of the people and responsible to the opinion of the people. It will have a tonic effect on every department of Indian life. Transfer of power may not furnish an immediate,

automatic and complete solution of the communal problem, but it may induce a fresh sense of responsibility and enforce reciprocal adjustment.

HINDU OR MUSLIM SOLIDARITY

Nothing is more hazardous than to hold that the problem can be solved through Hindu or Muslim, as distinct from national, solidarity. It is doubtful if the secularist influences of the modern age allow of a mobilisation of theological fervour enough to furnish the only possible basis of such a solidarity. Secondly, the two communities are not free to fight out their quarrels at leisure in isolation. They have to reckon with the British Government and the entire trend of international developments. A civil war to cut the Gordian knot is not only ruled out by the geographical admixture of the two communities but is also abhorred by the Hindus and the Musalmans alike. If, therefore, communal tension increases to the point of a trial of strength, it can explode only into riots, chiefly in cities and the environs.

RIOTS

Chronic rioting entails a breakdown of established social habits and suspends all the higher controls of behaviour. It marks a reversion to simple animal-like activities; the sadistic cruelty which it evokes, the covert assault, the ambush and the hide and seek, the attack on old men, women and children, the looting and incendiarism soon provoke a reaction in favour of "strong government." They jeopardise the chances of self-government, for men prefer security to liberty when it comes to a choice between the two. Riots introduce subtle changes into the social tissues, enfeebling their capacity for resistance against foreign attack. They bring to the fore the under-world of ruffians who rob and molest all communities with perfect impartiality. Occasionally, they create a situation in which festivals and weddings can be celebrated only under police

guard. At last the atmosphere may become so charged that a storm can break out at any moment without an apparent cause. A social order grounded in fear and insecurity necessarily represents a very low type. When animosities grow more intense and are shared more widely, they threaten and impeach the impartiality and discipline of the public services, including the security services, and bring civic life to the verge of anarchy.

FUTILITY OF "LAISSEZ-FAIRE"

It is not in terms of communal solidarity that a national problem can find a solution. Nor, on the other hand, is it possible to leave the solution of the Hindu-Muslim problem to chance. *Laissez-faire* does not go far because social problems of this character demand a conscious elimination of certain misconceptions and prejudices.

SOLUTION AS A WHOLE

The problem will become easier of solution in proportion as it is understood to be part of the entire Indian problem in the widest sense. It is at bottom an aspect of the problem of adjustment to a plane of subjection, illiteracy, poverty, limitation of horizon and narrow prejudices which mar the spiritual well-being of all. It is an unthinkable sign of over-acquiescence in a low *status quo* that men are content to fight for the little that there is instead of co-operating to secure the plenty within easy reach.

WIDER ASPECTS

It follows that a Hindu-Muslim *rapprochement* is more than a means of wresting power from a reluctant bureaucracy. It is really an item in the movement towards a higher and fuller life—the movement towards universal and improved education, social justice, cultural integration, spiritual endeavour, enthusiasm of humanity, economic welfare, preparation for defence and modernisation of government.

INTERDEPENDENCE

There is a complex of social interests which every community reflects and sustains as a whole. Every important change calls for a new equipoise of reciprocal adjustments which together constitute social organisation. A great advance in one direction is likely to stimulate corresponding advance in other directions. The supreme art of politics lies not in finding equivalents but in valents. Fundamentally, the solution of a social problem ought to take the form of a creative synthesis, integrative of the principles of growth. The truer an interest, the more closely does it approximate to universality. Feuds die away as social life becomes fuller.

CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY AND ITS RISKS

As to the specific issues of a political character, the plan of a constituent assembly has, *prima facie*, much to recommend itself but it is extremely hazardous in the absence of prior agreement on joint electorates. Separate electorates may accentuate the tension and diffuse it as widely as the electorate of the proposed assembly. Far from curing the so-called bourgeois classes of their separatism, the masses may be infected by it in the course of the electoral campaigns. Nor should it be forgotten that a constituent assembly is a device of framing the constitution, not of healing communal schisms. It is therefore necessary to fall back on the conference method and outline a constitutional settlement at a conclave of the spokesmen of the various parties in the Central and Provincial legislatures and their national leaders.

ARBITRATION

It may, however, be necessary to supplement the conference method, in regard to Indo-British relations, by arbitration. It is not feasible to refer the whole Indian problem to arbitration but points on which agreement may be found difficult or

impossible may be referred by common consent to a high juridical authority such as the Federal Court at Delhi, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the Permanent Court of International Justice or a panel of the International Court of Arbitration. It has lately been suggested in some quarters that the Indian problem may be referred to the President of the United States or to the heads of the Allied Nations as a whole. It has been urged by eminent men in India, England and the United States that the Indian problem has widened from an Indo-British concern to world importance and must, therefore, be solved as a part of world reorganisation.

STANDARDS OF PUBLIC LIFE

In India, as everywhere else, it is necessary to raise the tone and the standards of public life and, above all, to refrain from invoking sectionalism in elections. Public life should realise itself as a learned and spiritual calling, anchored in knowledge, character and catholicity. Experience of affairs is valuable. Self-sacrifice is even more valuable and is a proof of disinterested devotion to the public good. But nothing can replace the knowledge of history, the social sciences and world affairs as the foundation of political judgment. A higher sense of responsibility may follow a transfer of power and an increase in the number of those with actual experience of administration. But a conscious improvement in methods of controversy and a conscious appeal to reason rather than to emotion and prejudice are desirable. Misrepresentation or exaggeration renders agreement difficult and keeps up the mentality of strife. John Morley's dictum that bad manners are a crime in India applies not merely to Englishmen whom he had in view but to all engaged in public activity. One recalls several occasions in 1929-30 and 1937-40 when lapse from courtesy banned the commencement of conversations which aimed at abridgment of the gulf between the Congress and the Muslim League. It is quite as important to remember that humility has a place and a function in public

life and in seats of authority no less than in private life. It invites and welcomes co-operation and counteracts the tendency to corruption which is almost inherent in power.

FAVOURABLE FACTORS

The Hindu-Muslim problem has assumed an acute form but it is by no means insoluble. Whenever the heat of controversy permits a cool examination of the issues, it is often discovered that the things that unite men are deeper than the things that divide them. The great religions of mankind have a great deal in common. Besides, in India the religious cleavage does not at all coincide with ethnic differences. Nor does it yet coincide in any large measure with the linguistic or cultural cleavage. The mediæval inheritance of a common literary and artistic tradition still endures. There is a basic identity of economic interests among all the communities. There is a tradition of tolerance in India more than three thousand years old. Lofty codes of conduct still claim the allegiance of the Hindus and the Muslims alike. That decay is a sociological possibility cannot be forgotten by any student of Roman history, but Indian civilisation has amply demonstrated that its springs of vitality are still fresh. It has, in spite of very severe handicaps, effected important adaptations to changes in the environment during the last hundred years and proved that its energy of development is by no means exhausted. It is capable of absorbing science, getting rid of sectionalism and coming abreast of the times. It has satisfied one of the crucial tests of vigour—the capacity to throw up a large number of men and women who merge themselves into the social good and rise to heights of disinterested service and sacrifice. There is a growing perception on all sides of the need of banishing illiteracy and poverty and a growing realisation that this is possible only through concerted effort and as part of a common programme of social justice. The world situation, though partly a handicap, is also partly a help—it widens the mental horizon.

crisis that is threatening India may compel a closing of the ranks and a renunciation of dissensions which are a luxury of a sheltered existence. Even an internal crisis sometimes serves to call forth high moral qualities. Twice the Roman Republic came to the verge of secession and disruption—in 494 B.C. and again in 449 B.C. Twice the Roman patriotism surmounted the danger through compromise and constitutional innovation and set the commonwealth again on the path of internal peace and harmony.

NEED OF A MORAL EFFORT

That institutional reorganisation can go a long way to resolve the Hindu-Muslim tangles is patent, but what matters above all is the spirit behind the institutions. Common life is based on self-control—self-imposed limits and a tacit agreement to observe them. A moral effort is necessary to extend and deepen the sympathies, to keep true to the large public interest and to reinforce the unifying and harmonising influences. There rests an obligation on all those who believe in amity and concord not only to nurse the existing centres, but also to create new ones, of common endeavour in everyday life, in philanthropy, education, economics and politics.

THE PROSPECT

An integrated India may, by virtue of her resources, her man-power and her norm of values, still have a part to play in the new world that is struggling into emergence before our eyes. The thick darkness which seemed to settle over the scene may rise to unveil a variety and fullness of spiritual flowering and a rich promise of universal fraternity. It is the privilege of youth to hear the call of the future and see visions of the greater things to come. Its vitality, endurance and spirit of sacrifice may widen the area of patriotism, liberality and humanitarianism. It has to canalise its energies into radical and large-scale reconstruction and resolve firmly to maintain a grip on the higher values of life.

APPENDIX,

According to the Census of 1941, the population of India is distributed as follows :—

British India	Total	295,809,000
States and Agencies	Total	93,189,000
				<u>388,998,000</u>

Within British India, the principal communities are distributed as follows :—

(Figures in thousands.)

	Hindus other than Sched- uled Castes.	Sched- uled Castes.	Muslims.	Christ- ians.	Sikhs.	Total Popula- tion.
Madras ...	34,731	8,068	3,896	2,047	0.4	49,342
Bombay ...	14,700	1,855	1,920	375	8	20,850
Bengal ...	17,680	7,379	33,005	166	16	60,307
U.P. ...	34,095	11,717	8,416	160	232	35,021
Punjab ...	6,302	1,249	16,217	505	3,757	28,419
Bihar ...	22,174	4,340	4,716	35	13	36,340
C.P. ...	9,801	3,051	784	59	15	16,814
Assam ...	3,573	676	3,442	41	3	10,205
N.W.F.P.	180	—	2,789	11	38	3,038
Orissa ...	5,595	1,238	146	28	0.2	8,729
Sind ...	1,038	192	3,208	20	31	4,535
Total British India ...	150,890	39,921	79,399	3,482	4,165	295,809

The principal communities are distributed as follows in six most populous Indian States :—

	Hindus other than Sched- uled Castes.	Sched- uled Castes.	Muslims.	Christ- ians.	Sikhs.	Total Popula- tion.
Hyderabad	10,382	2,928	2,097	220	5	16,330
Mysore ...	5,282	1,405	485	113	0.3	7,320
Travancore	3,146	396	434	1,960	—	7,070
Kashmir ...	694	113	3,074	4	66	4,022
Gwalior ...	3,463	—	241	2	2	4,006
Baroda ...	1,963	231	224	9	0.6	2,855
Total of six Principal States ...	24,930	5,073	6,555	2,308	73.9	40,321

In the other States and Agencies the population is divided as follows

	Hindus other than Sched- uled Castes.	Sched- uled Castes.	Muslims.	Christ- ians.	Sikhs.	Total Popula- tion.
The other States and Agencies	30,297	3,819	6,105	526	14,521	52,968
Total ...	55,227	8,892	12,660	2,834	1,526	93,189
Total India	206,117	48,813	92,058	6,317	5,691	388,998

